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Kirk et al.: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. TOOLEY v. MARTIN-MARIETTA CORP.: A POSITIVE
STEP FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN EMPLOYMENT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp.,1 the Ninth Circuit held
(1) a substitute charity payment, in lieu of union dues, is a reasonable method of accommodating the plaintiffs' religious objections to the payment of union dues under section 701(j) of the
Civil Rights Acts of 1964,· and (2) the accommodation requirement did not· contravene the first amendment's prohibition
against the establishment of religion.'

The plaintiffs were discharged for refusing to pay union
dues in· violation of a collective bargaining agreement executed
in 1976.· The plaintiffs refused to join the union or pay union
dues because such payment conflicted with their religious beliefs,' and offered instead to pay an amount equivalent to union
dues to charity-an offer the union refused.' They sought relief
against the company and the union under Title VII of the Civil
1. 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Hug
and Tang, J.J.), cert. denied. 50 U.S.L.W. 3465 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1981).
2. [d. at 1243. Section 701(j) of.the Civil Rights Act provides: "The term 'religion'
includes all aspecte of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or
prospective employee's religious observance or practice without due hardship on the conduct of the employer's businesa." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976).
3. 648 F.2d at 1246. The first amendment provides in part: "Congress shall make no
law respecting an establishment of religion ..•." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
4. 648 F.2d at 1241. The parties executed the contract pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 158
(a)(3)(1976), which provides in part:
(3) .•. Provided, That nothing in this subchapter or in
any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization
• • • to require as a condition of employment membership
therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such· agreement,
whichever is later ....
5. 648 F.2d at 1241.
6. [d.

25
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Rights Act of 1964.7
The union's claim that the loss of revenue due to plaintiffs'
non-payment imposed an undue hardship on the union' was rejected by the district court.' The district court issued an injunction prohibiting the plaintiffs' discharge. 1o The court also ordered the plaintiffs to pay to charity an amount equal to union
dues. l l
The union appealed on two grounds: (1) the decision was
clearly erroneous because the court mistakenly found no undue
hardship and (2) section 701(j) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act as
applied was unconstitutional under the establishment clause of
the first amendment. The Ninth Circuit unanimously rejected
7. Id. Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of § 703(a) and 703(c). Section
703(a) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) • . . to discharge any individual • . . because of such
individual's ... religion •.. or
(2) to limit, segregate, or claaaify his employees ..• in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because of such Individual's ... religion
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
Section 703(c) of the Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a labor
organization(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of his ...
religion .•.
(2) to limit, segregate, or cIauify Ita memberahip ... , or
classify ... any individual, in any way which would deprive or
tend to deprive any individual or ... employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his statUi as an employee .•.
because of such individual's ... religion •.. or
(3) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual in violation of this section.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1976).
8. 64S F.2d at 1243.
9. The district court found that: (1) the lou of dues attributable to plaintiff's nonpayment was approximately $600 per y~, (2) there was a lubstantial likelihood that
three other employees would request similar accommodation increasing the loes to $1,200
per year, (3) the union's 1978 income WBI $46,000-$4,300 more than expenses and (4)
there were sizeable budget surpluses since 1976 even though the union donated to charity. 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979).
10. 648 F.2d at 1241.

11.Id.
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both contentions and affirmed the district court decision by
holding the union did not demonstrate undue hardship and that
the requirement of accommodation does not violate the establishment clause when the government maintains a position of
neutrality and is not excessively involved in religious matters. I I
B.

BACKGROUND

The Statutory Challenge
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act)18 was
designed to prohibit employment discrimination. 14 In 1976, Congress amended the Act, focusing on discrimination based on religion. 11I Religious discrimination, unlike other types of invidious
discrimination, is especially problematic because of two conflicting policies, both of which command national approval. III First,
employment discrimination based on invidious criteria is prohibited. I ' Second, the harmonious relationships between business
and labor, using the vehicle of the union shop, must be
promoted. 18
However, business and labor must not discriminate against
12. 1d. at 1243, 1246.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 to 2000h-6 (1976).
14. 110 CONGo REc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964).
15. Section 701(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). See 118 CONGo REc. 705, 706 (1972)
(remarks of Mr. Randolph). For the text of § 701(j), see note 2 supra. The amendment to
the Civil Rights Act that later became § 701(j) was approved unanimously. 118 CONGo
RBC. 731 (1972).
16. 648 F.2d at 1242; Anderson v General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589
F.2d 397, 400 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For the text of these sections, see
note 7 supra. See also Nottelson v Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,643 F.2d 445,
450 (7th Cir. 1981) (Title VII is an exception to NLRA union security clauses), cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); McDaniel v Essex Int'l, Inc., 571 F.2d
338, 343 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Since July 2, 1964 ... , there has been no national policy of
higher priority than the elmination of discrimination in employment practices.").
18. Courts that have stre88ed the importance of the union shop have been concerned
about the possibility of free riders. See Nottelson V. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U.
19806, 643 F.2d 445, 456 (7th Cir. 1981) (pell, J., dissenting) (notwithstanding the plaintiff's payment to charity, he is still a free rider via-a-vis the union), cert. denied, 50
U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Gray V. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064,
1072 (5th Cir. 1970) (plaintiff was never asked to embrace the doctrine of unionism but
merely to pay his fair share), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971); Linscott V. Miller Falls
Co., 440 F.2d 14, 18 (let Cir.) (industrial peace is objective of union shop), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 872 (1971); Linscott V. Miller Falls Co., 316 F. Supp. 1369, 1372 (D. M888. 1970)
(p088ibility of free riders will seriously disrupt commerce).
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an employee and/or member on the basis of religion. 1i Thus, the
conflict between the national policies of promoting the union
shop and ameliorating employment discrimination intensifies
when an individual fails to conform to a business practice or join
or support a labor union because of his or her religious beliefs.lo
Congress has attempted to reconcile this conflict through
section 701(j) of the Actl l which imposes a duty on the employer
to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs unless it results
in undue hardship. The Ninth Circuit applied the duty of accommodation to unions in Yott v. North American Rockwell
Corp. (Yott //).11 Several other circuits have followed suit. II
Most of the problems concerning accommodation have
arisen in two factual contexts: (1) a religious employee refuses to
work on the Sabbath, or on religious holidays which do not conform to mainstream religious sabbaths and holidays," or (2) a
religious employee refuses to join or support a union or other
business practice.III Although all courts recognize the employer's
duty to accommodate the religious beliefs of his employee-aside from the constitutional objections that a few
courts have raisedlS-the courts are divided as to what consti19. Sections 703(a) and (c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For the relevant text of these sections, see note 7 supra.
20. See cases cited notes 24-25 infra and accompanying text.
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). For the text of § 2000e(j), S88 note 2 supra.
22. 602 F.2d 904, 909 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980). The plaintiff
in Yott II argued that § 701(j) did not maridate consideration of hardship to the union.
The court held that since neither the employer nor the union can discriminate against an
employee, it is not unreasonable to consider the burden on the union. Id.
23. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. la, 1981); Cooper v. General Dynamics,
Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163, 170 (5th Cir.) (Brown, C.J., concurring) (both
union and employer have a duty of accommodation and thus the union may show hardship as well), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806 643 F.2d 445 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Yott II, 602 F.2d 904 (9th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied. 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair
Aerospace Div.• 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072
(1979); Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp. (Yott I), 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
25. See, e.g., Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C.• Inc., 595 F.2d 441 (8th Cir. 1979); Chrysler
Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977); Huston v.
Local 93. Int'l Union. 559 F.2d 477 (8th Cir. 1977); Draper v. United States Pipe &
Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975).
26. See cases cited note 84 infra and accompanying text.
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tutes reasonable accommodation. I '7
The trend in the circuit courts has been to construe broadly
the employer's duty to accommodate" and one circuit has stated
that Title VII is an exception to the national policy of union
security clauses.I i This trend is gaining momentum despite the
Supreme Court's decision in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,lo which narrowly construed the employer's duty to accommodate. sl The Hardison Court held that the employer was not
required to violate the seniority clause in a collective bargaining
agreement in order to accommodate the religious needs of a SabbatarianSII and that any cost of the accommodation in excess of a
de minimis amount constitutes undue hardship."
Notwithstanding the Hardison decision, the Ninth Circuit
has favored a broad interpretation of the 'employer's and union's
duty to accommodate the religious needs of their respective employees and members.se The Ninth Circuit has considered four
cases nearly identical factually to Tooley. In Yott v. North
American Rockwell Corp. (Yott 1),111 the plaintiff was discharged
for failing to pay union dues because of his religious beliefs."
The defendant offered to allow him to pay an equivalent amount
27. Compare Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant does not have to bend over backwards to accommodate the plaintiff' but rather work
within the seniority system) and Chrysler Corp. v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.)
(employee also has a burden of accommodation), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1977) with
Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 959 (8th Cir. 1979) (defendant must point
to some actual additional cost to establish undue hardship) and Draper v. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 519 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant must first attempt to
accommodate the employee within his own classification and transfer him only as a last
resort). See generally Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1033 (1975).
28. See cases cited note 17 supra.
29. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 450 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981).
30. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
31. [d. at 84.
32 A sabbatarian is an individual who reserves one day a week for exclusively religious activities.
33. 432 U.S. at 84.
34. See Yott II, 602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980);
Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 406 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1072 (1979); Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397,
402 (9th Cir. 1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Yott I, 501 F.2d 398, 403 (9th Cir.
1974).
35. 501 F.2d 398 (9th Cir. 1974).
36. Id. at 400.
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to a charity of his choice. S7 The plaintiff refused, claiming that
one of his religious tenets prohibited forced contributions to anyone, even his own church. 88 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the
judgment for the defendants, using a balancing test to weigh the
societal interests in labor peace and free flow of interstate commerce against the individual's interest in first amendment
rights. 89 The court concluded that the balance fell in defendant's
favor because of a strong congressional policy against permitting
free riders to share in the benefits of unionism without paying
the cost, whereas the cost to the individual is merely finding
non-union shop work which is generally less remunerative!O

In the next case involving non-payment of union dues for
religious reasons, Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division,fl the Ninth Circuit first recognized the conflict
between union security agreements and Title VII accommodation." It then set out the burden to be borne by each party with
respect to accommodation.4s The plaintiff must show a bona fide
belief that union membership and the payment of dues violate
his religious faith, that he informed both the employer and the
union of the conflict with the collective bargaining agreement,
and that he was discharged for failure to join the union and
tender dues." The burden then shifts to the defendant to show
a good faith effort to accommodate plaintiff's religious beliefs or
demonstrate that it was unable to reasonably accommodate the
plaintiff's beliefs without undue hardship."
In Burns v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.,'- the
Ninth Circuit rejected the union's claim of undue hardship
which was based on the loss of dues attributable to plaintiff's
37.Id.
38.Id
39. Id. at 403.
40. Id. at 404.
41. 589 F.2d 397 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979).
42. Id. at 400. The district court in Anderson held that the burden of going forward
with respect to accommodation was not borne by either party. The only relevant question was whether an accommodation could be reached. 430 F. Supp. 418, 421 (S.D. Cal.
1977). The district court found that the plaintiff refused to pay union dues because he
distrusted the union, not because of his religious beliefs. Id. at 422.
43. 589 F.2d at 401.
44.Id.
45. Id. at 402.
46. 589 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
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non-payment." The court also reaffirmed its view in Anderson
by stating that dissatisfaction among fellow employees did not
by itself establish undue hardship. The court required actual
disruption of the work routine. 48 The court also rejected the
union's claim that granting this substitution would open the
door to more requests for substitution, resulting in a greater
than de minimis burden," as hypothetical or speculative, hence
inadeq~ate to satisfy the requirement of undue hardship. 50
Finally, in Yott II,II the Ninth Circuit decided on statutory
grounds that the employer had made a reasonable attempt at
accommodation and that all the plaintiff's proposals would have
resulted in undue hardship." The court, however, did not reach
the constitutional issue.1II
The other "circuits and the Supreme Court vary widely in
their views of what constitutes "reasonable accommodation" and
"undue hardship."M One concern of the courts that narrowly
47. Id. at 404-05.
48. Id. at 406-07. The union's hardship case was based on suppositions that free
riden would cause serious dissension resulting in inefficiency of operation. Id.
49. Id. at 407.
5O.ld.
51. 602 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980).
52. Id. at 907.
53. The district court in Yott 11 held that § 701(j) unconstitutionally violated the
tint amendment's proscription of an establishment of religion. 428 F. Supp. 763, 767
(C.D. Cal. 1977). The court reasoned that religious objections are accorded a preference
not given to political or moral objections, and stated that the government must be neutral in religious matten, even if it results in sacrifice to the individual. Id.
54. The circuits which have narrowly construed § 701(j) have taken several approaches. Fint, they seem to stress the severe, adverse impact of allowing exceptions to
union shop clauses even if the clause burdens the plaintifl"s right to the free exercise of
religion. See cases cited note 18 supra. See also Linscott v. Miller Falla Co., 316 F. Supp.
1369, 1372 (D. Mass. 1970) (requirement to pay dues did burden plaintifl"s right to free
exercise of religion but the burden was justified by the compelling governmental "interest
of promoting labor peace). But cf. Note, Accommodation of an Employee's Religious
Practices Under Title V11, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 867, 885-86 (1976) (a seniority system is not
a sufficiently compelling interest to overcome religious liberty). The courts fear that exceptions will swallow the rule and defeat the purposes of the National Labor Relations
Act. Ct. Bums v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589 F2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1978) (if excusing
the plaintiff opens a floodgate of dues avoiders so that the union's fiscal integrity is at
stake, there need be no accommodation), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
Specifically, these courts are concerned about the possibility of free riden-those
who get the benefit of unionism without paying a fair share of the cost-resulting from
bogus claims of religion. These are justifiable concerns, given the court's extreme reluctance to ever inquire into the validity of one's religion. "It is no business of courts to say
... what is a religious practice or activity ... :' Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897,
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construe the accommodation requirement is that social legislation which benefits all members of society should not be invalidated because of the religious preferences of a few.611 The Eighth
Circuit, in Chrysler Corp. v. Mann,r's expressed concern that because the statute requires the employer, not the employee, to do
the accommodating, the employee might be intransigent and
force the employer to capitulate to his demands.1I7 Consequently,
that court held the employee must at least cooperate with attempts at reasonable accommodation, and the employee cannot
shirk all responsibility to the employer,l'8 Most courts hold that
if a religious precept does not permit any accommodation on its
face, the employee may be legally discharged.e•
The circuits that have supported a broad reading of section
701(j) have also struggled with the concept of reasonable accommodation and undue hardship. These two concepts interrelate in
that an employer must accommodate the employee's beliefs up
to the point where undue hardship to the employer exists. Accommodations are unreasonable if the employer stops short of
that point.so Thus the critical inquiry is: At what point does undue hardship exist? One court assumed that any accommodation
900 (7th Cir. 1978) (quoting Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 70 (1953». Religion can
be arbitrary, irrational, inconsistent, and eccentric and still merit protection under the
first amendment. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425,
1430 (1981). Furthermore, a believer need not be consistent in his behavior or may act on
some tenet, in the name of religious freedom, that is not universally held by the church
to which the individual belongs. ld.
55. See Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R., 429 F.2d 1064, 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1001 (1971). Although general policy often contradicts specific religious
belief, "it is not possible in an ordered society to allow every aspect of religious belief to
stay the hand of government under the aegis of the First Amendment." ld.
56. 561 F.2d 1282 (8th Cir. 1977).
57. ld. at 1285.
58.ld.
59. The courts have generally recognized a narrow exception to the duty of accommodation when the religious tenet is 80 unconventional that there is no foreseeable
method of accommodation. E.g., You II, 602 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1979) (employee's
religious tenet which prevented any compulsory contribution to charity so that the substitute charity accommodation would not work, justified employee's discharge), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir.
1970) (employee who not only refused to work on his Sabbath but refused to have anyone substitute for him believing that he was encouraging others to sin, was properly
discharged), af/'d by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). See Draper v. United
States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975) (possible to prove undue
hardship without actually attempting to accommodate).
60. See text accompanying notes 63-68 infra.
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would entail some hardship, but concluded that not all hardship
is undue. 61 According to the Ninth Circuit in Anderson,
"[u]ndue hardship means something greater than hardship."61
Recognizing the lack of standards to judge the point at
which hardship becomes undue, courts have attempted to give
these words meaning through positive and negative examples.
For example, no undue hardship exists when the union is deprived of an individual's dues"a when other employees grumble
and complain about favoritism,64 or when the union incurs a
small administrative cost.'11 Undue hardship does exist when the
union incurs a greater than de minimis cost," the proposed accommodation compromises the safety of all employees,6? or the
proposed accommodation violates a bona fide collective bargaining agreement." The Supreme Court, in Hardison, settled the
question of undue hardship by defining the undue hardship
standard as any cost in excess of a de minimis amount.69
61. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
62. 589 F.2d at 402.
63. Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806, 643 F.2d 445, 451 (7th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981).
64. Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397,402 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979); Burns v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 589
F.2d 403, 406-07 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979).
65. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1246.
66. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
67. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d SIS, 521 (6th Cir. 1975).
68. Id. Wren v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 595 F.2d 441, 445 (8th Cir. 1979); Chrysler Corp.
v. Mann, 561 F.2d 1282, 1285 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U. S. 1039 (1977); Huston v.
Local 93, Int'l. Union, 559 F.2d 477, 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
69. 432 U.S. at 84. The Court accepted the district court's express findings that any
of Hardison's proposed accommodations would have resulted in undue hardship. [d. at
83 n,14.
The Hardison dissent denounced the majority's reasoning and conclusion. First, the
dissent attacked the majority's condemnation of unequal treatment, stating that accommodation, to any significant degree, involves inherently unequal treatment. Thus, to condemn unequal treatment is tantamount to emasculating the statute. [d. at 87. Second,
the dissenters disagreed with the Court's formulation and application of the undue hardship standard. The dissent stated that to equate undue hardship to anything more than
de minimis cost was to stretch the English language beyond recognition. [d. at 93 n.6.
Furthermore, they argued, even if the majority correctly formulated the standard, it was
incorrectly applied. Id. at 92. The district court found that $150 for three months constituted an undue hardship on the defendant's business. [d. at 92 n.6. This extra cost
amounted to only a de minimis burden on the employer. [d. The dissent did not accord
great weight to the district court's finding because there was nothing in the record to
suggest that the district court properly interpreted and applied the term undue hardship. [d.
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The Constitutional Challenge

One of the more controversial aspects of the duty of accommodation is whether it unconstitutionally establishes a religion.
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof ...."70 This seemingly simple statement has
generated volumes of litigation as to what Congress and the
states can do with respect to regulating or accommodating religious beliefs.71 The Supreme Court has often been called upon
to resolve conflicts between the free exercise and establishment
clauses.7lI The court has noted a general harmony between the
two clauses, although the free exercise clause has a reach of its
own. 78 However, the Court has also pointed out that either
70. u.s. CONST. amend. I.
71. Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 68, 274 A.2d 832,
837 (1971).
Because the courts have left many questions in this area unanswered, commentators
have assumed widely varying positions in determining standards for the scope of both
clauses. See Clark, Guidelines lor the Free Exercise Clause, 83 HARv. L. REV. 327, 331
(1969) (importance of a law should be measured by incremental benefit of applying it to
religious objectors); Shetreet, Exemptions and Privileges on Grounds 01 Religion and
Conscience, 62 Ky. L.J. 377, 392 (1974) (tendency of courts is to exalt free exercise clause
over establishment clause); Note, supra note 54, at 875 (the privilege of inaction should
be protected against state intrusion while religious action can be regulated). One commentator gave greater weight to the establishment clause and reasoned that the state
may not prefer one person over another in any way on the basis of religion. Shetreet,
supra. Another commentator gave greater weight to the free exercise clause by reasoning
that the state may not interfere with religion absent a compelling state interest, and then
only if it pursues the route least restrictive of religious liberty. Note, supra note 54.
72. See Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973) (inevitable
tension exists between the free exercise clause and the establishment clause and it may
often not be possible to promote the former without violating the latter); see, e.g., Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1960); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.s. 296 (1939).
73. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461 (1971). One example of the reach of
the free exercise clause is Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The majority there
found no conflict with the establishment clause because: (1) paying benefits to sabbatarians was a neutral government act; (2) there was no excessive involvement; (3) the law did
not abridge any other person's religious liberty. Id. at 409.
Justice Stewart's concurrence interpreted the free exercise clause most liberally stating that the Constitution commands positive protection of religious freedom by the government. [d. at 416. He described the Court's decillions interpreting the establishment
clause as "positively wooden" and contrary to the intent of the clause. Id. at 414. Justice
Stewart stated that he would not find an establishment clause violation unless the government tended to exalt one sect over another. A law that benefits all religions equally
would be constitutional. Id. at 416.
In his dissent, Justice Harlan took precisely the opposite view. He acknowledged
that "the Constitutional path of neutrality is not so narrow a channel that the slightest
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clause taken to an extreme would clash with the other and thus
has recognized that it must balance both clauses and attempt to
strike a middle course that neither respects an establishment of
religion nor prohibits its free exercise." In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"
the Supreme Court stated that because religious freedom is
highly valued in the constitution, the strict scrutiny standard of
review applies whenever a law burdens its free exercise.'1'
deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation." Id. at 422. He
stated, however, that the free exercise clause does not compel a state to provide exemptions for religious objectors but merely permits it. Id.
74. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
76. Id. at 233. See 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 206(1) (1956): "Under the constitutions, freedom of religion is in a preferred position, and in balancing the constitutional
rights of property owners against those of the people to enjoy freedom of religion, the
latter occupy a preferred position."
Although a free exercise claim was not raised in Tooley, the standards used to evaluate this claim are very instructive because both a free exercise claim and a request for
accommodation are analytically similar, in that both are based on a claim of exemption
from a generally applicable state law.
Some commentators have suggested an action/inaction dichotomy to divide protected from unprotected religious practices. Clark, supra note 71, at 346; Shetreet, supra
note 71, at 413; Note, supra note 54, at 875. Religious action may not be protected if it
runs counter to the public policy of a state or violates a health, safety, or criminal law.
See generally Clark, supra note 71, at 340-50. The courts have condemned polygamy,
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), and the use of illicit drugs in religious
ceremonies, Leary v. United States, 383 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1967), rell'd on other grounds,
395 U.S. 6 (1969). This is consistent with the principle that religious believers have an
absolute freedom to believe, but only a qualified freedom to act, subject to the state's
interest in promoting the welfare of its citizens. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
303-04 (1939); Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d 883, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
Religious inaction exists when the religious individual seeks. an exemption from a
generally applicable state law. See generally Clark, supra note 71, at 345-47. One should
not, however, interpret the dichotomy to mean that claims of exemption must always be
honored. The dividing line in exemption claims is crossed if the exemption of a few individuals will defeat the purpose of the statute or endanger other individuals. Thus one
court has stated that general innoculation schemes to prevent the spread of disease overcome a religious person's objections. Wright v. DeWitt School Dist., 238 Ark. 906, 385
S;W.2d 644 (1965). Although most courts have held that an individual employee may be
exempt from a union security clause, an employer may not refuse to bargain with a union
on the basis of a religious objection. Cap Santa Vue v. NLRB, 424 F.2d at 889-91.
The Supreme Court has Interpreted the free exercise clause not only to permit (or
require) exemptions, but also to prohibit the withholding of state granted benefits if the
free exercise of religion is thereby burdened. In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963),
the Supreme Court held that former employees could not be denied state employment
benefits because the plainti1f refused to work on Saturday, her Sabbath. Id. at 404. The
Court reasoned that to require the plaintiff to make herself available for Saturday work,
the state was forcing her to choose between her religion and her benefits. Id. Imposing
such a burden on the religious individual was tantamount to fining her for Saturday
worship. ld.
The Supreme Court in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S.
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The trend in religion cases is toward a more generous treatment of religious freedom.'7'7 An early Supreme Court case stated
that the separation of church and state must be complete and
unequivocal and permit no exceptions.'78 Later, the Court retreated from this absolutist view of the first amendment, reasoning that it has never been thought desirable to enforce a regime
of total separation'79 and that the correct position of government
vis-a-vis religion is benevolent neutrality-neither sponsorship
nor interference. so The Court has summed up its position thus:
"The general principle deductible from the First Amendment
and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not
tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. "sl
In Lemon v. Kurtzman,8!J the Court established a test to deCt. 1425 (1981), recently affirmed the Sherbert holding. There, the plaintiff, a Jehovah's
Witness, quit his job because he refused to work on any assembly line that directly produced articles of war. Id. at 1428. The defendant board denied the plaintiff unemployment benefits because the state law only allowed payment of such benefits if the plaintiff
was terminated for good cause. Id. at 1429. The defendant also argued that other Jehovah's Witnesses had worked producing gun turrets and thus the plaintiff's refusal to
produce them was not a religious objection but a personal one. Id. at 1428.
The Supreme Court held that putting substantial pressure on a religious adherent to
modify his behavior created a burden upon religion. Id. at 1432. The Court dismissed the
defendant's contention that the plaintiff's belief was a personal one. A belief need not be
held by all members of a particular religion to qualify as religious. Id. at 1430. In any
case, it was certainly not the business of the Court to judge the validity of religious
beliefs.
77. See Shetreet, supra note 71, at 399.
78. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312 (1952).
79. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973).
SO. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.s. 664, 669 (1970).
81. Id. It is critical to remember that the Supreme Court conaiders atheism and
agnosticism to be religions within the purview of the first amendment. See Epperson v.
Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968):
[Government] may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of no religion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote
one religion or religious theory against another or even against
the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion.
Id. at 104 (footnote omitted). See also Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509
F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975). Thus a law that benefits all religions-as the term is commonly
understood-may stiII violate the establishment clause because the religious is preferred
over the secular (atheist). Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,771 (1973)
(a law need not establish a religion to be unconstitutional, it merely needs to respect an
establishment of religion. A benefit to all religions may respect the establishment of
them.).
82. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
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termine the constitutionality of a law challenged as an establishment of religion. According to Lemon, a law must (1) have a secular legislative purpose, (2) have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, and (3) not involve excessive government entanglement with religion. B8
.
Several courts have challenged the constitutionality of section 701(j)." Because there is no direct guidance from the Supreme COurtBD as to the constitutionality of section 701(j), one
must look to the test articulated in both L~mon and Committee
for Public Education v. Nyquist. B6 Most courts have applied
these tests to section 701(j) and concluded that the statute is
constitutional. B7 However, other courts, taking guidance from
the Supreme Court's narrower decisions, have come to the opposite conclusion. 88
First, some courts have attacked the statute on the basis
that it lacks a secular legislative purpose.a. They claim that although prohibiting religious discrimination is a secular purpose,
the statute goes beyond that by requiring that employers not
only avoid discriminating against a religious employee, but actually accommodate the employee's religious beliefs." The courts
have refused to equate the duty not to discriminate with the affirmative duty to accommodate.'l By requiring the employer to
accommodate an employee's religious beliefs, the statute has established a preference for the religious over the secular, and thus
has departed from the constitutional path of neutrality.'·
Second, a minority of courts have argued that the primary
83. [d. at 612·13.
84. See Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 329 (6th Cir. 1970) (accommo·
dation requirement raised grave constitutional questions); Yott II, 428 F. Supp. 763
(C.D. Cal. 1977).
85. When the constitutional challenge was raised in Hardison, the Supreme Court
avoided it by narrowing the scope or the statute. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. 413 U.S. 756, 773 (1973).
87. See text accompanying note 83 supra, and notes 96·104 infra and accompanying
text, and cases cited therein.
88. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 335 (6th Cir. 1970); Yott II, 428 F.
Supp. 763, 766 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
. 89. See. e.g.• Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.• 429 F.2d 324. 335 (6th Cir. 1970).
90. [d.
91. [d.

92. Yott II. 428 F. Supp. 763. 767 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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effect of the statute is to advance religion. 911 One court reasoned
that workers with strong political, social or moral objections to
unions are still compelled to pay union dues and to work when
assigned. 94 Thus, the strength of one's convictions is irrelevant.
The exemption from certain obligations depends on that conviction being categorized as religious. Non-religious objectors are
still forced to choose between their beliefs and their jobs. Consequently, religious objections are protected while others, equally
strong, are not.
The majority of the courts which consider section 701 (j)
constitutional apply a different analysis to the three-prong
Lemon-Nyquist test. 911 First, the majority of courts hold that
prohibiting religious employment discrimination is a sufficiently
secular legislative purpose." The requirement of accommodation
is one means of realizing the goal of non-discrimination." This
requirement also affords extra protection to religious freedom-a value of admittedly high social importance. 98 That this
requirement results in unequal treatment of employees does not
render the statute unconstitutional. 99 As one court pointed out,
if no unequal treatment were allowed, the requirement of accommodation would be a nullity and might conflict with the free
exercise clause. loo
The second prong of the Lemon-Nyquist test-that the
law's primary effect must not advance religion-is also fulfilled
by section 701(j). The primary purpose of the statute is to obliterate the necessity of an employee choosing between his job and
93. See, e.g., Yott II, 428 F. Supp. 763, 767 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
94. [d. at 766.
95. The Lemon-Nyquist test is set out in text accompanying note 83 supra.
96. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 90-91 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Nottelson v. Smith Steel Workers D.A.L.U. 19806,643 F.2d 445,454-55, cert.
denied, 50 U.S.L.W. 3376 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1981); Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F.
Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979); The Supreme Court, 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70,
271 n.47 (1977).
97. See cases and material cited note 96 supra.
98. See note 76 supra.
99. Brown v. General Motors Corp., 601 F.2d 956, 962 (8th Cir. 1979). If no dift'erential treatment were permitted, it "would preclude all forms of accommodation and defeat
the very purpose behind [section 701(j»." [d.
100. [d. Although the free exercise clause does not mandate accommodation in the
statutory sense, the strict scrutiny standard still demands that the least restrictive
means of fulfilling a compelling state interest be used. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1432 (1981).
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his religion except when the nature of the job mandates certain
activities contrary to the employee's religious scruples. The primary benefit of this statute inures to the individual employee
and not to a particular religion. That the religion may receive
incidental or tertiary benefits from an accommodation does not
render the statute unconstitutional. lol
Finally, the majority of the courts argue that the accommodation requirement does not require excessive governmental entanglement with religion. 1011 There is nothing intrinsically complicated about the accommodation requirement that requires the
courts' constant surveillance. loa Once a court finds that accommodation is required, its task is over.l04
C.

COURT'S ANALYSIS

In Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., the Ninth Circuit upheld an injunction preventing the defendants (employer and
union) from discharging the plaintiffs for failure to pay union
dues, provided they paid an equivalent amount to charity. 1011
First, the court established that religious discrimination is prohibited by sections 703(a) and 703(c) of the Act,toe Then, it
quoted section 701(j) of the Act as requiring reasonable accommodation unless the employer can show undue hardship.lo7 It
also held that the union was subject to the duty of accommodation Under section 701(j) even though the statute is framed in
terms of the employer's duty,to8
101. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973).
102. See cases cited note 96 supra.
103. See cases cited note 96 supra.
104. See cases cited note 96 supra.
105. 648 F.2d at 1241.
106 ld. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-2(c) (1976). For text of these sections, see
note 7 supra.
107. 648 F.2d at 1241. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976). For text of this section, see note 2
supra.
108. 648 F.2d at 1241. This application is not unreasonable considering that unions
are also prohibited from engaging in employment discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c)
(1976). The Ninth Circuit, in Yott 11,602 F.2d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 928 (1980), applied the accommodation requirement and the hardship limitation to
unions. The Sixth Circuit, in Cooper v. General Dynamics, Convair Aerospace Div., 533
F.2d 163, 169-70 (5th Cir.) (Brown, C.J., concurring), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 908 (1976),
stated that both union and employer have a duty of accommodation but the statute is
confined to hardship on the employer's business. See also notes 22-23 supra and cases
cited therein.
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Defendants first argued that plaintiff's request to pay an
equivalent amount to charity in lieu of union dues was inherently unreasonable. The defendants urged that allowing this
type of accommodation would clash with the congressional policy of promoting union shop agreements. 108 The court answered
that preventing employment discrimination is an equally important congressional policy. Section 701(j) represents Congress' attempt to balance both interests through the medium of reasonable accommodation. The court also drew support for its finding
that the accommodation was reasonable from the' recent amendment to section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act which
permits substitute payments if agreed to by the parties in their
collective bargaining agreement. no The court then concluded
that the requested accommodation was reasonable because the
defendant enjoyed the benefits of a union shop agreement while
the plaintiffs kept their jobs and practiced their religion. I I I
The union claimed that the accommodation was inherently
unreasonable because it would result in unequal treatment. HI
The court found that unequal treatment is not by itself unreasonable. ll8 Since no other employee's rights were compromised
by the accommodation, the union had no substantial costs, and
the plaintiffs suffered the same economic loss, the accommbdation was reasonable. ll4
The union also asserted that allowing this accommodation
would deprive the union of funds necessary to its operation,
thereby resulting in undue hardship. HI The Ninth Circuit accepted the district court findings that the union had ample
money in its reserve to accommodate all the religious employees
and still maintain a surplus.llI Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that the de minimis standard announced in Hardison applied, it stated that a determination of hardship depended
109. 648 F.2d at 1242. See note 4 supra for the text of the statute on employer
agreements with labor organizations.
110. For the text of § 19 of the National Labor Relations Act, see note 131 infra.
111. 648 F.2d at 1242.
112. ld. at 1243.
113. ld..
114. ld.
115. [d.
116. [d. (relying on Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030-31 (D.
Or. 1979)).
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on the facts, and could not be extrapolated from a hypothetical
situation.ll7 As a result, unless a union can show that an accommodation will deprive it of funds necessary to its operation, district court findings of no undue hardship will not be rejected by
the Ninth Circuit as clearly erroneous. U8
The final issue was whether section 701(j) violated the first
amendment as an establishment of religion. The Ninth Circuit
stressed that the Supreme Court's definition of neutrality has
enough flexibility to accommodate the religious practices of each
religion. ll8 As long as the government remains neutral between
different religious sects and does not sponsor, support or involve
itself in religious activities, there is no first amendment violation. 1l10 The Ninth Circuit held that the accommodation did not
violate any of these requirements. First, this charity substitution
provision put the plaintiffs on equal footing with the rest of the
employees who had no religious objection to unions, thus maintaining the government's neutrality in the face of religious differences. 1lI1 Second, there was no sponsorship, support or assistance .involved since employees with religious objections are not
granted an exemption but are merely allowed to substitute dues
for charity, thereby suffering the same economic loss as non-religious employees.1IlI
The court th~n applied the Lemon-Nyquist testllll to determine section 701(j)'s constitutionality. First, the statute must reflect a clearly secular purpose. The union contended that this
requirement 'was not met because Congress enacted section
701(j) to secure special privileges for some religions. 1I4 The court
refuted this contention by concluding that section 701(j) was
merely part of a statutory scheme designed to eradicate employment discrimination on the basis of certain invidious criteria.1U
ll7. 648 F.2d at 1243.
ll8.Id.
ll9. Id. at 1244.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1245.
122, Id .
.,,,. 123: A law withstancjs constitutional challenge if it (1) has a secular legislative pur·
pose; (2) has a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibIts religion; and (3) does
not involve excessive government entanglement w,jth religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602, 612·13 (1971).
~
124. 648 F.2d at 1245.
125. Id.

<0

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

17

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5

42

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:25

Since this purpose is wholly secular, the court concluded that
the statute had a clearly secular purpose.1lI8
Second, the statute's primary effect must neither advance
nor inhibit the plaintiff's religion. The union argued that allowing the employee to substitute charity for dues gave him a
freedom of choice unavailable to other employees. Ill" The court
classified this benefit as incidental and ancillary and rejected the
union's argument that this choice conferred a primary benefit on
the plaintiff's religion. U8 The union also argued that exempting
the plaintiffs from union dues would result in curtailing union
services or raising dues to make up for the loss, either of which
imposes the burden of accommodation on unaccommodated private parties. The court answered this argument by stating that
an inappreciable abstract burden is not enough to establish a
first amendment violation. 118
The third part of the Lemon-Nyquist test requires no excessive government entanglement. The Ninth Circuit summarily
concluded that the administration of the accommodation involved little or no government supervision.Jlo
D.

SIGNIFICANCE

It must be noted at the outset that the precise issue decided

in Tooley-accommodating a religious objection to the payment
of union dues-has become moribund due to Congress' recent
amendment of section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act.l8l
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

[d.
[d. at 1246.
[d.
[d.
[d.

131. Act of Dec. 24. 1980, Pub. L. No. 96·593, 94 Stat. 3452 provides in part:
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to estab·
Iished and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations
shall not be required to join or financially support any labor
organization as a condition of employment; except that such
employee may be required in a contract between such employees [sicl employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic
dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and
initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization charitable fund ....
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This amendment has obviated the need to determine reasonable
accommodation and undue hardship in the dues paying context.
Section 19 plainly states that certain religious objectors shall not
be required to financially support a union but may be required
to pay an equivalent amount to charity if so provided in the collective bargaining agreement. The statute would be applicable
even when hardship results since that limitation does not appear
in the amendment.
This amendment has accomplished several worthy ends: (1)
it has abolished any inconsistency among the circuits; (2) it
frames the employee's right to be free from discrimination in
this particular context as an absolute and not a conditional right
subject to a finding of undue hardship; and (3) it establishes
standards for defining religion. In order to qualify for an exemption the religioUs objector must show that the individual's belief
stems from a religious tenet of the church, and that the church
has historically held a conscientious objection to labor unions. m
The importance of defining religion can not be underestimated. Although the courts are very hesitant to define religion,
many commentators have stated that the courts must make
some kind of determination in this area.188 For example, suppose
a very conservative Presbyterian refuses to join a union for ostensibly religious reasons. Under the Supreme Court's decision
in Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,l84 the courts can inquire no further into the legiti132. Id. Section 19 may have raised some constitutional questions. Specifically, that
one must be a member of a church to qualify for an exemption might run afoul of the
establishment clause as the statute would benefit certain religions and churches and not
protect other religious objectors who do not belong to a church. See United States v.
Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 172 (1965). However, a religious objector who does not qualify for
the automatic exemption under § 19 may still pursue the more general remedy under §
701(j) of the Civil Rights Act.
133. See Clark, supra note 71, at 337·39 (courts must at least distinguish between
conscientious and insouciant believers); Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination
and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH. L. REV. 599, 618·19 (1971) (there
is a need for a standard by which to measure religious practices).
134. 101 S. Ct. 1425 (1981). The Court stated that a religious claim of exemption is
not limted to those persons who object to a state law on the basis of a religious tenet but
also to persons who have a personal religious objection. Thus the first amendment pro·
tects not only group religious beliefs but individual religious beliefs as well. Since the
Court has retreated from any analysis of the legitimacy of a religious claim, the result
will likely be that many persons will claim an exemption on any ground and clothe it
with religious language. The court will be helpless to expose the true nature of the claim.
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macy or veracity of the Presbyterian's claims. This is true even
though the Presbyterian Church does not have a tenet prohibiting union membership. It therefore becomes impossible to separate protected religious claims of exemption from unprotected
moral, social or political claims of exemption. The statute was
designed not to protect religious individuals who refuse to join a
union but to protect religious individuals who refuse to join a
union on religious grounds. Minimally, the individual should be
required to show a nexus between his religious beliefs and his
claim of exemption. A religious person may object to a union on
political grounds. However, since there is no relationship between his objection and his religion, the claim to exemption
should fail just as a non-religious individual's claim would fail.
Although the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Tooley is well reasoned, it suffers in one particular respect: It fails to conscientiously apply the standards announced in Hardison, specifically
the de minimis test. l81 The court implicitly rejected the precedent established by Hardison by holding that the union had suffered no undue hardship. However, if one compares the facts of
Hardison and Tooley, one is immediately impressed by the great
disparity between the cost to the defendant TWAin accommodating Hardison and the cost to the defendant Local 8141 in accommodating Tooley. In Hardison, it was estimated that it
would cost TWA $150 over a period of three months to pay
overtime wages to replace Hardison for his sabbath absences. l88
At the end of that three month period Hardison could have
transferred back to his original department where he had sufficient seniority to avoid Saturday work. Thus the conflict between Hardison's job and his beliefs was temporary and the cost
of accommodation was only $150. By contrast, Tooley along with
five other religious objectors, requested a permanent accommodation which would cost the union $1200 per year.187 Thus, the
cost borne by the union was eight times greater than that in
Hardison which the Supreme Court found not de minimis.
135. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,84 (1977). The Ninth Circuit, as
well as other courts, has been hesitant to apply the de minimis text as strictly as the
Supreme Court did in Hardison. One commentator criticized the opinion as parsimonious and contrary to the broad remedial provisions of the Act. Note, The Supreme Court,
1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REV. 70, 271 (1977).
136. 432 U.S. at 92 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
137. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 476 F. Supp. 1027, 1030 (D. Or. 1979).
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The Ninth Circuit and the district court justified their decisions on the grounds that the requested accommodation would
have merely reduced the union's surplus, resulting in practically
no hardship at all. Despite the logic of this holding, it is contrary
to the Hardison decision. Apparently, the Hardison Court considered the employer's ability to pay irrelevant. As the dissent in
Hardison pointed out, TWA is one of the largest air carriers in
the United StateS. I88 To suggest that a $150 cost would rept'esent an undue hardship on the employer's business was simply ludicrous. 18s To put it simply, the Tooley decision does not
comport with Hardison although it is better reasoned, fairer and
more closely realizes Congress' intent in enacting section 701(j).
One of the enigmas surrounding religious discrimination
cases is why it is treated differently than other types of invidious
employment discrimination. As the Fifth Circuit stated: "Title
VII provides a remedy against employment discrimination on
the basis of an employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... The use of the word 'or' evidences Congress' intent
to prohibit employment discrimination based on any or all of
the listed characteristics. "140
One possible reason for the different treatment of religious
discriminatjon is that religion is a matter of choice while race
and sex are immutable characteristics.1U Notwithstanding this
distinction, religious discrimination is no less arbitrary than race
or sex discrimination. l41 Although race and sex discrimination
are similar to religious discrimination in both content and effect,
the courts have formulated a lesser standard by which to judge
religious discrimination. For an employer to fulfill his burden in
a religious discrimination case he need only show that an accom138. 432 U.S. at 91.
139. 1d.
140. Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032 (5th
Cir.198O).
141. Edwards & Kaplan, supra note 133, at 637. This distinction has some support
in the legislative history which demonstrates Congress' overriding concern with racial
employment discrimination. See 110 CONGo Rsc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964).
142. See 110 CONGo Rsc. 1521, 1528-29 (1964). It is somewhat callous to suggest that
persons could change their religious beliefs to suit the needs of their jobs. It is far more
likely that religious employees will quit their jobs in order to adhere to their religious
beliefs. The threat then exists that the adherents of a minority religion will become the
marginally employed and unemployed members of our society, thus creating a permanent economic underclaas.
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modation would impose a greater that de minimis cost. However, an employer who discriminates on the basis of race must
still satisfy the requirements of the business necessity
doctrine. 148
The courts often impose a greater than de minimis cost on
business and labor to eradicate the effects of past racial employment discrimination. 14. The Ninth Circuit, in United States u.
Ironworkers Local 86,141 ordered the defendant union to create
"special apprenticeship programs designed to meet the special
needs of average blacks with no previous experience or special
skills in the trade, or black applicants who have some previous
experience ... but do not meet journeymen standards."I•• Obviously, setting up a training program to train persons with substandard skills will be expensive. This requirement illustrates
how far courts are willing to go to eliminate racial discrimination
in employment. The courts should go just as far to eliminate religious discrimination. Undue hardship should be interpreted to
comply with the business necessity doctrine.
There are essentially three reasons why the accommodation
requirement should be set higher. First, a stricter standard
would promote greater religious diversity and a richer cultural
heritage. In One court has specifically stated that one of the
143. One court has defined business necessity to be an irresistible demand: "Necessity connotes an inesistible [sic) demand. To be preserved, [a present employment practice) ... must not only directly foster safety and efficiency of a plant, but also be 88118Dtial to those goals." Watkins v. Scott Paper Co., 530 F.2d 1159, 1168 (5th Cir.) (quoting
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971) (bracketed
material and emphasis from Watkins), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has recently departed from the absolute necessity requirement announced in Watkins in favor of a reasonable necessity requirement. Contrares v. City of Los Angeles, 656
F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981). See Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 702-04 (8th
Cir. 1980). The court described the burden as follows: (1) the plainti1f must show that
the business practice results in disparate treatment or disparate Impact on a protected
class; (2) the defendant then must show that the practice is a business necessity; (3) the
plaintiff' must show it is a pretext for discrimination or that there are non-discriminating
ways of achieving legitimate business goals. [d. See generally Blumrosen, StraTl/len in
Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71
MICH. L. RBv. 59 (1972).
144. See, e.g., United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 635 (6th Cir. 1973)
(union ordered to participate in a minority job training program); accord, Southem m.
Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680, 681 (7th Cir. 1972).
145. 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971).
146. [d. at 548.
147. See 118 CONGo RBc. 705, 706 (1972) (remarks of Mr. Randolph). The sponsor of
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main purposes of Title VII was to preserve religious diversity. us
The real issue, then, is not a religious versus secular confrontation but rather a majority versus minority religious confrontation. Most religions do not have religious objections to unions
and most keep Sunday as their Sabbath. By refusing to allow
accommodation to minority views, some courts have implicitly
stated that only those views that accede to majoritarian doctrines merit first amendment protection. The Supreme Court
has stated that any religion, no matter how unconventional,
merits first amendment protection. I.e
A second reason for imposing a stricter standard of accommodation is· to protect the individual's right to religious freedom. This was Congress' most pressing concern in amending section 19 of the National Labor Relations Act to include all
religious objectors. lllo One commentator has suggested that too
little value is given to the principle of religious freedom,ll1l and
has criticized the undue hardship test because "[fjairness further demands that protection of religious liberty be founded on
social and moral values rather than on business expediency or
incremental increases in social efficiency."ll1l1 The author soundly
pointed out that the application of the undue hardship test results in an enigma: If an employee is highly skilled and hard to
replace, it is more likely that his religious exemption will be defeated on the grounds of undue hardship. On the other hand, an
unskilled and easily replaceable employee will enjoy greater reli§ 701(j) lamented that employer practices were decimating the ranks of many minority
religions. Id.
148. Young v. Southwestern Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 141 (5th Cir. 1975).
149. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 101 S. Ct. 1425, 1430
(1981). The free exercise clause was designed to protect the one percent who hold different religious views, Valent v. New Jersey State Bd. of Educ., 114 N.J. Super. 63, 70, 274
A.2d 832, 840 (1971), and ensure that the rights bestowed by the first ten amendments
are not subject to a majority vote. sur v. State Democratic Executive Comm., 500 F.2d
1307, 1308 (5th Cir. 1974).
150. Several ·congressmen voiced apprehension over imposing on the employee the
grievous choice of either obeying one's religion or keeping one's job. See 126 CONGo REC.
760, 761 (daily ed. Feb. 11, 1980) (remarks of Messrs. Hinson, Clauson and Erlenborn).
151. Note, supra note 54, at 884.
152. Id. at 891. Ct. Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d at 1244 (the court
implied that if many employees objected to dues on religious grounds they need not be
accommodated); Clark, supra note 71, at 332. "Similarly, the number of persons who
invoke the privilege of [conscientious objection to some law] has been considered by
commentators to be a highly important fact in estimating whether a constitutional right
to such objection should exist." Id.
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gious freedom.1II3 One's visceral reaction to this allocation of basic human rights by reference to an individual's economic value
is that such allocation is contrary to the spirit of our constitutional freedoms which do not distinguish between rich and poor,
urban and rural, black and white. 1M
Assuming that the standard for acommodation does not
present cultural diversity or individual rights problems, the
standard cannot be justified even by a close economic analysis.
The rationale for the undue hardship test is that business
should not bear excessive costs that are uneconomical and inefficient. From a purely economic perspective, this appears to be a
wise policy (assuming efficiency is the highest goal in our economic system) but it is an extremely myopic view because it
overlooks several hidden costs. First, the company may lose the
services of a highly valued employee lllil and have to train a replacement. Second, there are several significant social costs
which need to be calculated to arrive at an economic result. One
of three events can happen to a terminated employee: (1) find a
similar job in another company, (2) find a lower skilled job!" or
(3) remain unemployed.
The latter two choices are probably more realistic because
the same factors which previously conflicted with the employee's
religion will presumably appear again in similar companies. In
the second scenario, the employee is transformed from a fully
productive to a marginally productive worker. Some of his formerly utilized skills are wasted representing a significant social
cost. Far more serious is the third scenario which imposes grievous cost on society. In this case, the employee contributes nothing to the productivity of the economy and in fact becomes an
economic liability through unemployment insurance payments.
153. Note, supra note 54, at 884.
154. See Richards v. Townsend, 303 F. Supp. 793, 795 (N.D. Cal. 1969), modified on
other grounds, 444 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1971).
155. Cf, Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515, 518 (6th Cir.
1975) (plaintiff was a competent employee whose services were highly valued by the company); Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 140, 142 (5th Cir. 1975)
(Plaintiff was, by all accounts, an excellent employee and enjoyed a good relationship
with peers and supervisors alike.).
156. Note, supra note 54, at 884.
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Although these costs are less visible than the cost of accommodation, they are no less real and may in fact be greater. By imposing a higher standard of accommodation on the employer, it
will force him to internalize many of these costs that previously
were borne by society.

E.

CONCLUSION

In Tooley, the Ninth Circuit took another step to insure religious liberty in the face of an apparently contrary Supreme
Court decision in Hardison. Although the specific holding was
narrow, the Tooley court has given a broad definition to the
statute. The problem of non-payment of union dues was legislatively handled and will probably not arise often. However, in
reference to other requested accommodations, the appropriate
standard should be the business necessity doctrine, a higher
standard which will better promote religious diversity, individual freedoms, and efficiency.
Jeff Kirk

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATEWIDE ANTI-BUSING LAW THAT DEFEATS A LOCAL DESEGREGATION PLAN

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Seattle School District No.1 v. Washington,t the Ninth
Circuit held that a state law banning busing for purposes of
" ...I(!chool desegregation, but not for other school purposes, is an impermissible legislative classification based on racial criteria. The
coUrt's ruling, striking down on equal protection grounds a
statewide /ilDti-busing initiative, should be very encouraging to
school districts· which are trying voluntarily. to desegregate.
Three local school districts sued to enjoin the enforcement
of the anti-busing law, Initiative 350, an amendment to the state
education code adopted by a substantial majority of Washington
1. 633 F.2d 1338 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Ely, J.; the other panel members were Nelson,
J. and Wright, J. dissenting), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No.

81-9).
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state's voters in November 1978.1 The challenged statute, while
not expressly racial in nature, created a "neighborhood schools
policy," that permits local school districts to reassign and bus
students out of their neighborhood for every significant educational purpose 8 except that of rectifying racial imbalances in the
public schools. Court-ordered school busing for racial integration
is unaffected by the statute.·
Prior to the enactment of Initiative 350, the three plaintiff
school districts had begun a variety of programs aimed at elimi2. Seattle School Oist. No.1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1009 (W.O. Wash.
1979). The measure was approved by a 66% margin statewide. The margin by unofficial
tally in Seattle was 61 % citywide, but it failed in two legislative districts of the city with
heavy minority voting. 473 F. Supp. at 1009. The plaintiff districts are Seattle, Tacoma,
and Pasco, Washington.
3. Initiative 350 provides, in relevant part:
Section 1. [NJo school board, school district ... , nor the
superintendent of public instruction . . . , shall directly or
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than
the school which is geographically nearest or next nearest the
student's place of residence . . . , except in the following
instances:
(1) If a student requires special education ... he may be
assigned and transported to the school offering courses and facilities for such special education . . . ;
(2) If there are health or safety hazards . . . between the
student's place of residence and the nearest or next nearest
school; or
(3) If the school nearest or next nearest ... is unfit or
inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack
of physical facilities.
Section 3. For purposes of section 1 of this act, "(tol indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the
school which is geographically nearest or next nearest ..." includes, but is not limited to, implementing, continuing, pursuing, maintaining or operating any plan involving (1) the redefining of attendance zones; (2) feeder schools; (3) the
reorganization of the grade structure of the schools; (4) the
pairing of schools; (5) the merging of schools; (6) the clustering
of schools; or (7) any other combination of grade restructuring,
pairing, merging or clustering: PROVIDED, that nothing in
this chapter shall limit the authority of any school district to
close school facilities.
Section 6. This chapter shall not prevent any court of
competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues
relating to the public schools.
633 F.2d at 1343 n.3.
4. 1d. Nowhere in the statute is there mention of desegregation.
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nating the effects of segregated community housing patterns.
These programs involved both voluntary and mandatory reassignment of students, thereby subjecting them to the new state
law. II Seattle, the largest of the three plaintiff districts, was not
under court order to desegregate its schools. Two years before
Initiative 350 was adopted, however, the Seattle district had voluntarily agreed to desegregate.- To achieve racial balance, the
district adopted the Seattle Plan, a program which included
mandatory busing. Although the Plan met with vigorous local
opposition,' the state court upheld it.· The board members
adopting the Seattle Plan narrowly defeated a recall attempt by
the organization that later sponsored Initiative 350. 9 Had the
state enforced the initiative, the Seattle Plan, and desegregation
efforts in Pasco and Tacoma, would have ground to a halt. 10
The trial court found Initiative 350 discriminatory, over5. 473 F. Supp. at 1002-07. Pasco adopted a busing plan in the Spring of 1965. Only
minority students had been bused. Tacoma operated a variety of optional enrollment
and voluntary busing programs since 1960 involving about 1,400 students. Seattle, faced
with numerous complaints under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, signed a memo·
randum of agreement to end segregation with the Office for Civil Rights on June 7, 1978.
The Seattle school board mandated busing under the Seattle Plan, adopted in March
1978 and implemented the following September. The Seattle school district had been
busing since 1972, and had desegregation programs as early as 1963. A "magnet" school
program, implemented in 1977-78, was to encourage students to transfer voluntarily from
their neighborhood schools to the "magnet school" which contained educationally·enhanced curricula. Id. at 1006.
6. Id. at 1007. The major feature of the Seattle Plan is the permanent assignment of
entire neighborhoods of students to schools other than those geographically closest to
their homes for a portion of their school careen. Additionally, there were other voluntary
assignment options in some areas. Id.
7. Id. at 1006-08.
8. Roe v. Seattle School Dist. No. I, No. 838291 (King County Superior Ct., 1978)
(order denying injunction) and No. 838530 (King County Superior Ct., 1978) (order denying summary judgment).
9. 473 F. Supp. at 1006. The group sponsoring the recall and seeking to enjoin the
busing plan called itself Citizens for Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC), a nonprofit corporation. Id. at 1007. That organization subsequently sponsored Initiative 350.
Id.
10. 473 F. Supp. at 1010-11. The state never enforced Initiative 350 because the
district court issued a preliminary injunction. 633 F.2d at 1341-42. At the time of the
injunction, the trial court granted the motion of eight Washington public interest groups
to intervene in the litigation to test whether Seattle and Tacoma schools were, in fact,
unconstitutionally segregated. The court bifurcated the litigation as follows: Phase I,
from which this appeal stems, dealt only with the constitutionality of Initiative 350.
Phase n, which was never reached because of the invalidity of the initiative, derives from
the intervenors' claim that the school districts operate unlawful dual school systems. Id.
at 1341.
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broad, and violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment because it created an illegal racial classification. l1 The Ninth Circuit affirmed. 11
This Note will explore the basis for the holding in Seattle
and discuss its significance to statewide anti-desegregation measures, and its relevance to California's Proposition I, an antibusing measure which the California Court of Appeal has
upheld. 18
B.

BACKGROUND

Equal Protection
Racially discriminatory laws have long been held invalid
under the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, I.
11. 633 F.2d at 1342.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's denial of attorneys fees to the plaintiffs
(both the school districts and the intervenors) as an abuse of discretion. rd. at 1347-50.
Public entities (such 'as school districts) are not exempted from the protections of the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), which authorizes the court "in its discretion" to award fees to prevailing parties, and 20 U.S.C. I
3205 (Supp. II 1978), part of the Emergency School Aid Act that provides for attorneys
fees for civil rights litigation involving schools. School districts are eligible to receive
attorneys fees as prevailing parties under §§ 1988 and 3205 "as long as [the) publicly·
funded organization advances important constitutional values." 633 F.2d at 1348 (citations omitted). The court ruled that the "bad faith" exception to attorney fee awards
applies only to named defendants in their individual, not their official, capacities. rd. at
1349 (citing Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693·700 (1978) and Williams v. Alioto, 625
F.2d 845 (9th Cir. 1980)).
Intervenors were likewise entitled to attorneys fees despite their "de minimis" role
in the litigation. They were prevailing parties under § 3205 because even though the
Phase II issues were not reached, "an award is permissible for an issue ... not fully
litigated if constitutional rights are vindicated through the mechanism of a consent decree or other preliminary relief." 633 F.2d at 1349 (citing S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, reprinted in [1976) U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 5912·13).
12. 633 F.2d at 1350.
13. Crawford v. Board of Educ. (Crawford II), 113 Cal. App. 3d 633,170 Cal. Rptr.
495 (1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3278 (U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81·38).
14. The clause provides: "No State shall make or enforce any law which ... [de·
nies) to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CoNST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
The Court has held that "all persons, whether colored or white, shall stand equal
before the laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose protection the
[fourteenth) amendment was primarily designed, that no discrimination shall be made
against them by law because of their color .... " Strauder V. West Virginia, 100 U.s.
303, 307 (1880) (overturning statute that provided "only white male persons who are
twenty·one years of age and who are citizens of this state" may serve on juries). See also
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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whether the racial classification in a challenged law is overtly or
covertly discriminatory.11
In Reitman v. Mulkey,I8 the Supreme Court also proscribed,
under the equal protection clause, state enactments which expressly sanction private discrimination.17 The Reitman Court
struck down a California initiative l8 that had effectively repealed fair housing laws and forbade the state from regulating
private racial discrimination in housing. The Court found the
California law's" 'immediate objective', its 'ultimate effect', its
'historical context and the conditions existing prior to its enactment' "19 were to dispossess minorities of vested rights, and concluded the law violated the fourteenth amendment as discriminatory "state action. ".0
School officials have broad authority to desegregate, independent of any finding of a constitutional violation. In Swann v.
Board of Education,ll the Court decided: "If school authorities
fail in their affirmative obligations under these holdings, [federal] judicial authority may be invoked.''1· In a companion case,
Board of Education v. Swann,l8 the Court overturned a state
anti-busing law which would have prevented a school board from
carrying out a court-ordered desegregation plan in a district that
15. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
16. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
17. 1d. at 381.
18. In 1964, California voters adopted Proposition 14, CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26, which
stated in relevant part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof
shall deny, limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of
any person who is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any
part or all of his real property, to decline to sell, lease or rent
such property to such person as he, in his absolute discretion,
chooses.
387 U.S. at 371. The Court said this law did not merely repeal an existing law forbidding
racial discrimination. Rather, it established racial discrimination as "one of the basic
policies of the State" in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 1d. at 380-81.
19. 387 U.S. at 373.
20. 1d. at 380-81.
21. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). The Court said school authorities have "broad discretionary
powers" and in the exercise thereof "might well conclude" as a matter of educational
policy "that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school
should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for
the district as a whole." 1d.
22. 1d. at 15.
23. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

29

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5

54

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:49

was de jure segregated.14
In Milliken v. Bradley,sa the Court held that suburban
school districts around segregated Detroit schools were apparently innocent of any intentional segregative acts, hence, not
under a constitutional duty to participate in Detroit's desegregation plans.
Although the Supreme Court has never held that local
school board policies have constitutional pre-eminence over
state law, in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez l6 and in Milliken, the Court emphasized some of the social
values of local control and autonomy in public education."
Racial Classifications

Government may not, through legislation, impose a special
burden on minorities in its attempts to achieve equal rights, the
Court held in Hunter v. Erickson. le In Hunter, the Court overturned a city charter amendment that required a special referendum to enact local fair housing laws.11 The Court said that while
the law was race-neutral on its face, it created a disproportionate burden on minorities seeking racial equality in housing and
thus "constitutes a real, substantial, and invidious denial of the
24. "[I)f a state· imposed limitation on a school authority's discretion operates to
inhibit or obstruct the operation of a unitary school system or impede the disestablishing
of a dual school system, it must fall; state policy must give way when it operates to
hinder vindication of federal constitutional guarantees." ld. at 45.
25. 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (judicial desegregation remedies must not exceed the geo·
graphical scope of the constitutional violation).
26. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
27. ld. at 50 (dictum); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. at 741·42. In Milliken, the
Court said: "No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been thought essential
both to the maintenance of community concern and support for public schools and to
quality of the educational process." ld.
28. 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969).
29. Akron City Charter amend. § 137 provided in part:
Any ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Ak·
ron which regulates the use, sale, advertisement, tran.fer, list·
ing assignment, lease, sublease or financing of real property of
any kind ... on the basis of race, color, religion, national ori·
gin or ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the
electors voting on the question at a regular or general election
before said ordinance shall be effective.
393 U.S. at 387.
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equal protection of the laws."·o Because the law restricted adoption of only fair housing laws and not other forms of racial or
housing laws, it was not "grounded in neutral principles of
law"·l and created an explicitly racial classification.8I
In Lee v. Nyquist,·· a New York district court applied the
Hunter reasoning to school desegregation and busing. The Lee
court overturned a state anti-busing laWS· because "the purpose
is clearly an impermissible one . . . [,] it structures the internal
governmental process in a manner not f~unded on neutral principles. . . . The New York legislature has acted to make it more
difficult for racial minorities to achieve goals that are in their
interest."11I However, since Hunter, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Davis·e has held disproportionate impact alone, absent
a showing of discriminatory purpose, insufficient to prove a constitutional violation.17
30. 393 U.S. at 393.
31. Id. at 395. Justice Harlan concurring, expounded at length on the distinction
between discriminatory legislation, such as the Akron ordinance, and general laws which
establish the various political structures of government. Statutes of the latter type do
not violate the equal protection clause merely because they occasionally operate to diaadvantage the Black political interests. Id. at 394. "If a governmental institution is to be
fair, one group cannot always be expected to win." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 392-93.
33. 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
34. The statute that gave rise to Lee was a 1969 state anti-busing law, N.Y. EDuc.
LAw § 3201 (McKinney 1969).
The purpose of [section 3201(2)] is to control the practice
initiated by the Commissioner of Education in this State of
assigning youngsters to public schools on the basis of race or
color in order to achieve a certain racial balance or quota, with
all of the waste, disruption, community upheaval and expense
which generally accompany such a move.

. . . [D]espite the mounting evidence of the failures of
these [racial balancing] schemes, they have continued to be
foisted upon unwilling communities by the Commiasioner of
Education.
318 F. Supp. at 717 (quoting New York State Senate Debate on A. 214 (1969), at 2454,
2459).
The Lee court said that § 3201, which only affected bUSing programs by the state,
"creates a single exception to the broad supervisory powers the state Commiasioner of
Education exercises over local public education." 318 F. Supp. at 718. That exception
creates a racial classification because it places "burdens on the implementation of educational policies designed to deal with race on the local level." Id. at 719.
35. 318 F. Supp. at 720 (citations omitted).
36. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
37. Id. at 240.
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The Supreme Court has consistently applied the strictest
scrutiny to racially discriminatory laws. ls Under this high level
of scrutiny, racial classifiers on their face violate the equal protection clause unless: (1) the classification serves an overriding
or compelling governmental interest;811 (2) the law is necessary to
the accomplishment of a permissible state policy; and (3) the
law is the least discriminatory means of achieving that governmental or state goal. 40
School Desegregation

In Brown v. Board of Education,41 the Court, holding that
"[s]eparate educational facilities [for black children] are inherently unequal"411 because such treatment generates feelings of
"inferiority as to their status in the community,"41 ordered the
defendant school district to desegregate "with all deliberate
speed."" Since Brown, the Court has imposed upon local s'chool
districts an affirmative constitutional duty "to eliminate from
the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed {de jure] segregation/'411 as distinguished from de facto segregation caused by
demographic and economic factors."
Lower courts have uniformly struck down anti-busing laws
when such laws hampered efforts of de jure segregated districts
to fulfill their constitutional duty." The Supreme Court has yet
38. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192·96 (1964). See auo Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. I, 11 (1967).
39. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
40. 1d. at 196.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. 1d. at 495.
43. 1d. at 494.
44. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
45. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 15 (1971) (emphasis added). Note that the
Seattle court found the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation to be "con·
stitutionally irrelevant in this context:'
46. Keyes v. School Dist. No. I, 413 U.S. 189 (1973). There, the Court said:
"[PJlaintiffs must prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was
brought about or maintained by intentional state action ... [consisting of) an unconstitutional policy of deliberate racial segregation .... " 1d. at 198.
47. Albertson, Equal Protection and the Neighborhood School Concept, 55 WASH.
L. REV. 735, 738 (1980). This article concerning Seattle at the trial court level cited Stell
v. Board of Public Educ., 334 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Ga. 1971); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp.
710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971); Alabama v. United States, 314 F. Supp.
1319 (S.D. Ala.), cert. dismissed, 400 U.S. 954 (1970); School Comm. of Springfield v.
Board of Educ., 366 Mass. 315, 319 N.E.2d 427 (1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 947 (1975).
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to rule on the constitutionality of state legislation that blocks
busing in de facto segregated districts. Seattle may become the
test case on that question.
C. COURT'S REASONING: A RACIAL CLASSIFIER THAT RESTRUCTURES THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The trial court based its legal conclusions on findings that
Initiative 350 (1) was motivated by discriminatory purpose;4I (2)
was overbroad;fe and (3) created an invalid racial classifier. The
appellate court refused to discuss the first two findings. &0
Rather, the Ninth Circuit focussed primarily on the principles
enunciated in Hunterll 1 and held that the challenged statute was
"correctly struck down as an impermissible legislative classification based on racial criteria."&S Regardless of the voters' motivaOnly one such case has reached the Supreme Court: Board of Educ. v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971). In Swann, the Court affirmed the lower courts' position and held that
"[t]o forbid, at this stage, all assignments made on the basis of race would deprive school
authorities of the one tool absolutely essential to fulfillment of their constitutional obligation to eliminate existing dual school systems." [d. at 46.
48. 473 F. Supp. at 1013. The court did not claim that the voters of Washington had
a subjectively discriminatory intent in adopting Initiative 350. In fact, it conceded that
many voters may have been motivated by the conviction that it would be in the beat
interests of their children to attend neighborhood schools. However, the trial judge said
subjective intent is not the constitutional teat of illegal discriminatory intent or purpose
that would render this law invalid. Rather the teat, found in Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), is based on five circumstantial
factors: (a) the impact of the action, i.e., whether it bore more heavily upon one race
than upon another; (b) the historical background of the decision; (c) the specific sequence of events leading to the decision; (d) the procedural and substantive departures
from the norm in connection with the decision or action; and, (e) the legislative or administrative history of the decision or action. 473 F. Supp. at 1014. The judge found that
Initiative 350 would cause a disproportionate negative impact on the education of minority children, and said the enactment was "conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for
the specific purpose of overriding [school busing] to balance Seattle schools racially by
means of student assignments." [d. at 1015.
49. 473 F. Supp. at 1016. The court found that "Initiative 350 is overly inclusive in
that it prohibits school assignments to achieve racial balance even in a school district
where there is de jure segregation, that is, segregation caused by prior governmental
action." [d. The court held that districts are under an affirmative duty to take "whatever
steps might be necessary to eliminate [de jure] segregation." [d. (citing Board of Educ. v.
Swann, 402 U.S. 43 (1971) and Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968». "[A]
statute which would proscribe a principal, and in some cases eBSentia! and exclusive step
to achieve that end must obviously violate constitutional requirements." San Francisco
Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 955, 479 P.2d 669, 680, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309,
320, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012 (1971).
50. 633 F.2d at 1342.
51. See text accompanying notes 28-32 supra, for a discussion of Hunter.
52. 633 F.2d at 1342.
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tion, the "operative legal and political effect" on Initiative 350
was discriminatory.1I8 The court further found that the law was
"conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for the specific purpose of overriding the decision of the Seattle school board to
balance Seattle schools racially by means of student
assignments. "114
Following the reasoning in Hunterli ll and Lee," the Seattle
court said that even though the statute contains no explicit racial classification, it contains one implicitly,lI'1 which is invalid
because it places unconstitutional "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process."1I1
The court found Initiative 350 to cause the political process
to become "skewed at the expense of local representative bodies
and their constituencies,"119 and held that the law "radically
restructure[d] the political process of Washington by allowing a
state-wide majority to usurp traditional local authority over 10[d. at 1343.
[d.
See 393 U.S. at 389-90, 392·93. Sef! also id. at 393·96 (Harlan, J., concurring).
See 318 F. Supp. at 718·20.
Although the initiative does not explicitly disallow stu·
dent assignment for racial reasons, as did the New York stat·
ute considered in Lee v. Nyquist, it achieves the same purpose
by enumerating those purposes for which there may be stu·
dent assignment and omitting from that enumeration the as·
signment of students in order to achieve racial balance. This is
as effective a racial classification as is a statute which ex·
pressly forbids the assignment of students for racial balancing
purposes.
633 F.2d at 1343 (citing the trial court, 473 F. Supp. at 1013).
58. 633 F.2d at 1344.
59. [d. at 1346. "Had a successor school board to the one that adopted the Seattle
Plan-instead of the state electorate as a whole-attempted to repeal or rescind the self·
imposed student assignment plan, we would be faced with a quite different issue." [d. at
1345·46 n.8. Significantly, the court found:
"The question of whether a rescisaion of previous Board
action is in and of itself a violation of appellants' constitu·
tional rights is inextricably bound up with the question of
whether the Board was under a constitutional duty to take the
action it initially took .... If the Board was not under such a
duty, then the rescission of the initial action in and of itself
cannot be a constitutional violation."
rd. (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman (Dayton I), 433 U.S. 406, 413·14 (1977».
The Seattle majority distinguished Dayton [ on the grounds that in Seattle a differ·
ent governmental body-the state· wide electorate-rescinded policies voluntarily en·
acted by local school boards already subject to local political control. rd. at 1346.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
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cal school board educational policies."eo
Given the finding of a racially suspect classification in Initiative 350, and an impermissible usurpation of local control over
local educational policy, the court found the initiative invalid
absent a compelling state interest.e1 In upholding the trial court,
the Ninth Circuit found no compelling state interest in returning the Seattle schools to the traditional neighborhood
schools policy.ell While neighborhood schools policies are not per
se constitutionally suspect,88 on balance, "[t]he interest ... in
mandating a state-wide policy of neighborhood schools must, in
these circumstances, fall to the paramount interest of locally
elected school boards ... in promulgating their own educational
policy,"84 the court reasoned.
The court discounted the fact that the Seattle schools had
never been adjudged to be de jure segregated, citing Leesa for
the principle that "a finding of de jure segregation is irrelevant
when majoritarian political processes are used to frustrate minority participation .... "ee Finding no compelling state interest in wresting control from local districts over educational policies, the court held the statute unconstitutional as a violation of
the equal protection clause.67 The court also flatly rejected other
defense assertions in the opinion."

60:

633 F.2d at 1344.
61. Id. at 1344 (citing McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192·96 (1964).
62. 633 F.2d at 1346. Cf. Association of Gen. Contr. v. San Francisco Unified School
Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1388-90 (9th Cir.) (state interest in lowest-bid contracting policy in
employment had priority over the school board's non-educational interest in voluntarily
adopting a minority affirmative action program), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 783 (1980).
63. 633 F.2d at 1345. The court said: "While 'a neighborhood school policy is not
constitutionally suspect', it is the locally·elected school authorities who 'are traditionally
charged with broad power to formulate and implement educational policy'. . . ." rd. (ci·
tations omitted).
64. 633 F.2d at 1346.
65. 318 F. Supp. at 719-20. See also Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 218 (1980).
66. 633 F.2d at 1345-46.
67. Id. at 1346·47.
68. The defendants cited Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (uphold·
ing congressional budgetary amendments that barred the Department of Health, Educa·
tion, and Welfare (HEW) from withholding federal aid to school districts with neighbor·
hood school assignment policies). The Ninth Circuit said the amendments in Brown did
not" 'make [a] classification along impermissible [racial] lines,''' as did Initiative 350,
and Brown was therefore inapposite. 633 F.2d at 1347 (quoting Brown v. Califano, 627
F.2d at 1230).
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The Dissent: No Discriminatory Intent

Judge Wright, dissenting, contended the Washington statute was valid: It interfered with no constitutional obligations of
local school boards because the law exempted court-ordered desegregation from its provisions," and no unlawful racial classification existed. Initiative 350 merely addressed a racial issue: desegregation. The majority has "confus[ed] the treatment of
racial problems with treatment on the basis of race.'''70
Absent a racial classifier, the applicable cases' 1 require
proof of discriminatory intent or purpose in adopting the challenged law to show a violation of the equal protection clause."
But motive or purpose mixes questions of law and fact, and the
plaintiff has the burden of proving that discriminatory intent
was a motivating factor in its adoption." The dissent found no
evidence that racial bias motivated a desire to restore neighborhood schools.'· The majority merely inferred such intent, the
dissent said, based on the adverse impact the challenged statute
had upon racial minorities. Impact alone, however, is constitutionally insufficient. '7&
The dissent further found the Hunter rule inapposite because the Hunter Court did not hold that the repeal of the existing fair housing ordinance violated the fourteenth amendment.'76 Rather, the Hunter Court found the city charter
amendment defective because it subjected future fair housing
ordinances to a more burdensome legislative process than other
ordinances. '77 And, because Initiative 350 did not alter the legis69. 633 F.2d at 1350.
70. Id. at 1353.
71. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, reh. denied, 444 U.S. 887
(1979); Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Dayton I, 433 U.S. 406
(1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
72. 633 F.2d at 1353.
73. Id. at 1353-54 (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977).
74. 633 F.2d at 1354.
75. Id. at 1354. The dissent cited the trial court's factual findings 7.30, 7.31 and
7.32, 473 F. Supp. at 1009-10, which acknowledged the many non-discriminatory rationales for supporting neighborhood schools.
76. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5.
77. Id. at 393.
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lative process or burden minorities procedurally,78 the state lawfully exercised its power over educational matters.n

D.

ANALYSIS

Suspect Classifier
Initiative 350 is a classic example of a creatively worded and
attractively promoted ballot measure whose purpose and intent
is carefully hidden by neutral-sounding phrases and omissions of
salient detail,8° Initiative 350's express purpose was to stop the
Seattle Plan and, in so doing, it trapped two other segregated
school districts in its net. 81
The Ninth Circuit, in affirming the trial court, correctly analyzed Initiative 350 as an implicitly racial law, one whose impact would be to permit white children the luxury of retaining
their neighborhood schools while black children would either be
left to fend for themselves in over-crowded ghetto schools,81 or
bite the bullet and assume the full burden of voluntary desegregation. sa The holding is vulnerable, however, to an attack under
the Washington v. Davis rationale: Adverse impact alone is a
constitutionally insufficient basis to attack a law that is not explicitly discriminatory. To resolve that issue, the Supreme Court
may remand the Seattle case to the trial court for further evidentiary proceedings on the question of intent.
To say that Initiative 350, like the charter amendment in
Hunter or the constitutional amendment in Reitman, is non-discriminatory because it permits voluntary desegregation or because it allows court-ordered busing begs the question." By for78. 633 F.2d at 1353 n.3 (citing WASH. CONST. art. II, § 3, which vests legislative
authority in the legislature but reserves to the people the power to enact bills independently through the initiative process).
79. 633 F.2d at 1353 n.3.
SO. See note 3 supra for the relevant text of Initiative 350.
81. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. at 1009-10 (discussing
the CiVIC campaign to "stop forced busing"). The initiative explicitly barred the desegregation provisions of the Seattle Plan. The trial court found that th08e programs and
provisions were the only feasible means to integrate the Seattle schools. Jd. at 1015.
82. Jd. at 1007, 1015.
.
83. Jd. at 1003, 1007.
84. The trial court findings made it abundantly clear that only through some form
of mandatory pupil reassignment, particularly in Seattle, would the districts be able to
integrate. Jd.
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bidding every major, effective technique for achieving racial
balance,BIi the initiative had the "clear purpose of making it
more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities to
achieve legislation that is in their interest."BI Procedural burden
is the central question raised by the Hunter rule.
A Restructuring of the Political Process

The dissent's contention notwithstanding,'7 Initiative 350
exploited state-wide anti-integration sentiment to stop the desegregation of three of Washington's 300 school districts." The
law marked a departure from the procedural normS' in overriding the Seattle School Board's desegregation plan because voters
who "could not conceivably be affected by any plan for the
mandatory assignment of students for racial balancing purposes"BO voted on and passed the initiative.
However, the Ninth Circuit majority appeared to misread
the law when it found that the state's interest in a neighborhood
schools policy "must, in these circumstances, fall to the paramount interest of the locally-elected school boards and the community they represent in promulgating their own educational
policy."Bl Local school districts are creatures of state law;'1
hence, a local school board has no constitutional prerogative to
set educational policy in contravention of state law.
Yet, Swann clearly dictates that local school boards not
only have a constitutional duty to remedy racial imbalances, but
they also have "broad discretionary powers" to set the racial mix
in each school as a matter of educational policy." Locallyelected school boards should and do have the authority to pass
independent initiatives to racially balance their schools "quite
85. 633 F.2d at 1342. See, for example, note 3 3upra.
86. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 395.
87. Namely, that "the record is devoid of evidence to contradict the state's contention that historical opposition to the Seattle Plan was motivated by race-neutral concerns." 633 F.2d at 1354-55.
88. 473 F. Supp. at 1008-09.
89. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S.
252, 267 (1977).
90. 473 F. Supp. at 1016.
91. 633 F.2d at 1345. See note 21 supra.
92. Mandatory Busing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495 P.2d 657 (1972).
93. Swann v. Board of Educ., 402 U.S. at 16.
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apart from any constitutional requirements .
''IN But that
does not preclude the state from setting educational policy in
opposition to local initiatives.
Under Hunter and Lee, Initiative 350 places unconstitutional burdens on minorities within the political process'" and
effectively disenfranchises minority voters'" in violation of the
fourteenth amendment.

As mentioned by the dissent, local boards share control over
educational policies with the state.·7 However, as a matter of
practical public policy, states are· ill-equipped either to dictate
details of school administration or anticipate the local political
and social nuances that are part of the calculus of sound educational policies. .
E. Seattle vs.

CALIFORNIA'S PROPOSITION

1

The California Court of Appeal in Crawford v. Board of Education·8 upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 1, a state
anti-busing amendment adopted by the voters· in November
1979. The parallels between Initiative 350 and Proposition 1, especially the reliance by the plaintiffs in both cases on Hunter,
make it useful to consider the implications of Seattle in the
Court's consideration of the challenge to Proposition 1."
Proposition 1 Background

Proposition 1 overrides state decisional lawlOO dealing with
94. [d. at 45.
95. 633 F.2d at 1344. See also Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 402 U.S. 935 (1971).
96. 633 F.2d at 1346-47. The plurality for Initiative 350 in Seattle does not detract
from this point, because Seattle residents voted to retain the school board members who
adopted the plan.
97. [d. at 1353. See WASH. CONST. art. 2.
98. 113 Cal. App. 3d 633,170 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1980), cert. granted, 50 U.S.L.W. 3266
(U.S. Oct. 13, 1981) (No. 81-38).
99. The two cases are to be argued together before the Supreme Court.
100. Jackson v. Pasadena City School Diat., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.
Rptr.606 (1963). Jackson held that even in the absence of de jure or intentional segrega~
tion, school boards are under an affirmative duty to deal with racial imbalances. In fulfilling that duty "consideration must be given to the various factors in each case, including
the practical neceBBities of governmental operation ... [,1 the degree of racial imbalance
in the particular school ... [,1 the difficulty and efl'ectiveneBB of revising school boundaries ... and the availability of other facilities to which students can be transferred." ld.
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school desegregation. The measure requires state courts to follow the narrower, more conservative federal rulings in applying
the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause to pupil
school assignment and student busing. lol
Federal courts, as noted, have authority to order desegregation only where they identify intentional or purposeful segregative state action. loll But the California Supreme Court has gone
further than the United States Supreme Court and has held that
school districts have an affirmative duty to correct racial imbalances in schools regardless of cause. loa
Proposition 1 does not relieve schools districts of their duty
to desegregate under state law, but removes busing from "the
arsenal of techniques available to state courts" to remedy de
facto segregation. l04 Significantly, Proposition 1, unlike Initiative 350, does not prohibit school boards from initiating busing
to integrate their schools. 1011
Like Initiative 350, Proposition 1 was the product of a
group seeking to stop, or at least stall, a massive cross-town busing and desegregation plan in Los Angeles, the state's largest
school district. loe Unlike Seattle, Los Angeles was under a tenyear-old state court order to desegregate a de jure system. 1M
at 882, 382 P.2d at 882, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 610. In San Francisco Unified School Dist. v.
Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d 669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309,cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1012
(1971), the court reaffirmed the rule in Jackson that school boards have an affirmative
duty to alleviate racial imbalance or racial isolation.
Crawford v. Board of Educ. (Crawford I), 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr.
724 (1976) established the duty to undertake "reasonably feasible steps" to alleviate seg·
regation in the schools regardless of its source. This case completely severed California
law from the federal rules that distinguish de facto from de jure segregation for purposes
of the equal protection clause. Id. at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738. Because
this holding was founded on CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), it created independent state
grounds on which to obliterate the de facto-de jure distinction.
101. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a):
102. See note 45 supra.
103. See note 100 supra. See also Glenn, State Court Desegregation Order, 26
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1183 (1979).
104. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 651, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
105. Id. at 651, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 507.
106. The plan that took effect in September 1978 involved 86,600 students, of which
32,000 were in a mandatory program. Glenn, supra note 103, at 1216. This was 15% of
the district's 567,260 students. L.A. Busing Starts Today; Leaders Urge Compliance,
L.A. Times, Sept. 12, 1978, § I, at I, col. 2.
107. Crawford I, 17 Cal. 3d at 286, 551 P.2d at 30,130 Cal. Rptr. at 727. The order
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The trial court finding of de jure segregation, however, was overturned in Crawford II,108 in light of United States Supreme
Court rulings handed down since the original trial court desegregation order.1" Desegregation efforts in Los Angeles have been
stalled as a result of Crawford II. A voluntary desegregation
plan has been in operation since September 1981,110 pending a
ruling by the Supreme Court.

Initiative 350 Distinguished
The Crawford II court, in dealing with the constitutionality
of Proposition 1, made several points that distinguish the California amendment from the Washington law: (1) Proposition 1
does not prohibit local voluntary desegregation; (2) Proposition
1 does not create a right to discriminate;111 (3) unlike the charter
amendment in Hunter, 111 Proposition 1 "embraces the protection of the fourteenth amendment and does not seek to violate
it;"118 (4) "rescission of the [Los Angeles desegregation plan]
cannot be unconstitutional" if the district is under no federal
constitutional obligation to correct racial imbalance;lu (5) based
in Crawford [ is No. C 822854 (L.A. Superior Ct. 1976).
108. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 503. While the California Supreme
Court i~ Crawford [ rendered the de facto-de jure distinction moot, the appellate court
held:
[N]o federal violation of law was established by the 1970 find·
ings, and the trial court's identification of the then· existing
racial segregation within the Los Angeles school system as de
jure segregation was true only in a Pickwickian sense, and was
not true at all in the sense of federal law. Because there was
no evidence of acts done with specific segregative intent and
discriminatory purpose, there was no federal constitutional vi·
olation-regardless of the terminology used by the court.
113 Cal. App. 3d at 646, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 503.
109. Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman (Dayton I), 443 U.S. 406 (1977); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424 (1976); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), cited in Crawford II, 113 Cal. App.
3d at 640-·41, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 499-500.
1l0. Los Angeles Schools Open Peacefully, S.F. Chronicle, Sept. 16, 1981, at 5, col.
4.
1l1. "[I]t merely removes court-ordered pupil assignment and transportation as a
remedy available to cure state-proscribed racial imbalance .... tt 113 Cal. App. 3d at
653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Cf. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
112. 393 U.S. at 387.
1l3. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
114. [d. at 653, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509. (citing Dayton I and Dayton 11). This is a
departure from the reasoning in Seattle, 633 F.2d at 1345-46, as to the power of the state
to rescind a desegregation plan adopted by a locally-elected board.
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on the espoused purposes of the California proposition, lUI the
Crawford II court found no discriminatory or segregative intent
in Proposition 1;118 and (6) Proposition 1 does not deprive minority groups of the vested right to an integrated education, it
merely prevents the courts from chosing court-ordered busing
from "among scores of remedies available for use by the court to
end racial isolation."117 In effect, Crawford II holds that no constitutional right to any particular remedy for illegal school segregation exists. 118
Underlying the positions in both the holding in Crawford
11119 and the dissent in Seattle 110 is a question of the efficacy of
busing to promote equality in education. Both the Crawford II
majority and the Seattle dissent cite Justice Powell's dissent in
Estes v. Metropolitan Branches, Dallas NAACP/11 in which
Justice Powell made some very disparaging remarks about the
social costs of busing. 111
115. The amendment declares:
[It is) necessary to serve compelling public interests, including
those of making the most effective use of the limited financial
resources now and prospectively available to support public
education, maximizing the educational opportunities and protecting the health and safety of all public school pupils, enhancing the ability of parents to participate in the educational
process, preserving harmony and tranquility in this state and
its public schools, preventing the waste of scarce fuel resources, and protecting the environment.
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a).
116. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
117. Id. at 655-56, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 509.
120. 633 F.2d at 1351-52.
121. 444 U.S. 437 (1980).
122.
The pursuit of racial balance at any cost-the unintended legacy of Green-is without constitutional or social justification.
Out of zeal to remedy one evil, courts may encourage or set
the stage for other evils. By acting against one-race schools,
courts may produce one-race school systems. Parents with
school age children are highly motivated to seek accesa to
schools perceived to afford quality education. A desegregation
plan without community support, typically with objectionable
transportation requirements and continuing judicial oversight, accelerates the exodus to the suburbs of families able to
move. The children of families remaining in the area affected
by the court's decree are denied the opportunity to be part of
an ethnically diverse student body.
444 U.S. at 450 (Powell, J., disaenting from a dismissal of a writ of certiorari).
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Busing, of course, is not a constitutional end in itself.1I3
However, it is a reasonably feasible means, and in many cases
the only strategy available, to break down the racial barriers
that have been erected through decades of discriminatory school
transfer policies.1.. Thus, it is no wonder that busing has become
a volatile code-word at the center of the maelstrom of the school
integration controversy. To those who have accepted the inevitability and the political imperative of abolishing dual school systems, as· has the Ninth Circuit majority, busing is a necessary
fortress for the protection of inviolate rights.
The Seattle court faced a law nakedly promulgated to prevent local school boards from fulfilling their fourteenth amendment obligations without a court order.lItI The Crawford II court
faced a different proposition: a law which merely eliminates independent state grounds as a basis for ordering school busing,
limiting state courts to what the federal courts can do under the
federal constitution. lie
Where busing is the only feasible means to desegregate a
school district, as is the case in both Los Angeles and Seattle,
laws banning busing effectively foreclose the possibility of
integration.
The United States Supreme Court will have to reconcile
these two cases in some manner with the Hunter, Reitman and
Washington holdings. Only Justice Rehnquist, denying a stay of
a busing order in September 1980 to the Los Angeles school district,117 has addressed himself to the issue in Crawford II. He
said Proposition 1 cannot violate the fourteenth amendment because it specifically embraces it. 11l8

F.

CONCLUSION

Piercing the transparent veil of Washington'S Initiative 350,
123. 113 Cal. App. 3d at 649, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 505.
124. Seattle School Dist. No.1 v. Washington, 473 F. Supp. at 1010-11.
125. ld. at 1016.
126. Board of Educ. v. Superior Court, 448 U.S. 1343 (1980).
127. "'[I]t is indeed difficult to accept the contention that by limiting a state court's
jurisdiction to that of the federal courts, there is somehow a violation of [the] federal
constitution.''' 113 Cal. App. 3d at 654,170 Cal. Rptr. at 509 (quoting Board of Educ. v.
Superior Ct., 448 U.S. 1343, 1345 (1980».
128. 448 U.S. at 1345.
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the Ninth Circuit in Seattle has correctly found an explicitly racial legislative classification which violates the equal protection
clause. Initiative 350 puts local school districts in a double bind
if they are constitutionally obliged to desegregate: They either
violate the equal protection clause or violate the initiative. l ••
The measure radically restructures the political process, making
it more difficult for racial minorities to achieve their political
rights, and usurps the power of local school boards to set local
educational policies when those policies benefit minority
groups.180
Seattle and Crawford II can be distinguished on both factual and legal grounds, and, therefore, are unlikely to influence
one another in the United States Supreme Court.
Robert E. Kroll

III. THE BUSINESS NECESSITY DEFENSE IN THE
NINTH CIRCUIT

A.

INTRODUCTION

In the last survey period, the Ninth Circuit decided two
cases focusing on defenses to Title VIP challenges to employment practices: Harriss v. Pan American World Airways· and
129. 473 F. Supp. at 1016.
130. 633 F.2d at 1346.

1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 702, 78 Stat. 255 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2oooh(6) (1976) (amended 1978». Section 2000e-2(a) reads:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend
to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2. 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Farris, J.; the other panel members were Schroeder, J., dissenting; and Anderson, J.).
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Contreras v. City of Los Angeles. s These cases illustrate a conflict within this circuit regarding what an employer must prove
to prevail against a plaintiff's showing that a facially neutral employment practice has had a disparate impact on a group protected under Title VII.

Purporting to adhere to long-standing Title VII case law,
the two panels articulated conflicting definitions of the business
necessity defense. In Harriss, a pregnancy discrimination case,
the court expressed a standard which adheres closely to traditional interpretations of the defense, but misapplied it. The
Contreras panel, on the other hand, although purporting to follow applicable precedent, in fact articulated and applied a
weaker standard in a case involving an allegedly discriminatory
testing procedure.
In Harriss, two Pan American World Airways (Pan Am)
flight attendants challenged Pan Am's maternity leave policy, alleging that the policy had a disparate impact on women, thereby
violating Title VII prohibitions against sex-based discrimination.· The Harriss case was tried and decided prior to the 1978
amendment to Title VII which specifically defines pregnancybased employment policies as per se sex discrimination.' The
appellate court, therefore, analyzed the pregnancy leave policies
under two theories: as a practice which, although neutral on its
face, had a disparate impact on women; and as a facial violation
3. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Wallace, J.; the other panel members were
Tang, J., concurring and dissenting; and H8IlIIon, D.J., sitting by designation).
4. 649 F.2d at 672.
5.
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected
by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical condition shall be
treated the same for all employment. related purposes ... as
other persons not so affected by similar in their ability or inability to work ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (Supp. II 1978), as amended by Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-555, 92 Stat. 2076. Congress amended the Act intending to expressly overrule the
Supreme Court's holdings in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (pregnancy
based classifications are not, on their face, sex discrimination under Title VII). By definition, pregnancy based classifications are per se violations of Title VII. H.R. Rep. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [19781 U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 4749, 4751. For
a further discussion of Gilbert, and the pregnancy amendment see Rutherglen, Sexual
Equality in Fringe Benefit Plans, 65 VA. L. REV. 199 (1979).
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of the Act as amended in 1978.6 The two analyses of the employment practice in Harriss are separate and distinct theories of
discrimination, giving rise to separate and distinct defenses.
The plaintiffs challenged three aspects of Pan Am's maternity leave policy. First, Pan Am required every female flight attendant to notify her supervisor within twenty-four hours upon
learning of her pregnancy.' After notification, the flight attendants began a mandatory, unpaid leave of absence (the stop-work
policy).8 Between sixty and ninety days after the birth of the
child, the plaintiffs were required to return to work (the startwork policy).' Finally, the defendant denied flight attendants
the right to accrue seniority after the first ninety days of maternity leave (the seniority policy).I o
In its pre-amendment analysis, which is the primary concern of this Note, the Harriss panel found all three policies had
a disparate impact on women, but that the employer had successfully justified the stop-work policy as a business necessity.ll
The court of appeals held that to prove a business necessity a
defendant must show that the challenged practice "has a manifest relationship to the employment in question."ll The panel
then remanded the case to the district court for further findings
on whether the stop-work and seniority policies satisfied the requirements of the business necessity defense. 18
The Contreras plaintiffs, six former city accountants and
auditors, alleged that two pre-employment screening tests unlawfully discriminated against Hispanics. l• In 1976, the positions
of city accountant and city auditor came within the city's civil
service rules and regulations, which required incumbent employees, including the plaintiffs, to pass a written examination before
assuming the positions of either senior accountant or senior au6. 649 F.2d at 673.
7. Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 413, 415 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
8.Id.
9. Id. at 415-16.
10. Id. at 415.
11. 649 F.2d at 676.
12. Id. at 674 n.3.
13. Id. at 676, 678.
14. 656 F.2d at 1271.
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ditor.lll Prior to 1976, when the plaintiffs were hired, employment decisions for these positions had been based on oral
inte~iews. UI

The Ninth Circuit in Contreras held: first, that plaintiffs
failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as to the
senior accountants examination;17 second, that, while successfully establishing a prima facie case of disparate impact of the
auditor examination, the plaintiffs failed to prove that less diScriminatory alternatives were available to the defendant;18 and
finally; that the defendant's proof that the auditor examination
was job-related satisfied the requirements of the business necessity defense and entitled it to judgment.It

It is not the purpose of this Note to delve into the intricacies of either the testing or pregnancy areas of Title VII jurisprudence, but rather to discuss the different theories of discrimination and focus on a comparison of the two panels' articulation
and application of the business necessity defense as it stands in
the Ninth Circuit.

B.

BACKGROUND

Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights ActiO prohibits most forms
of employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin, by employers, labor organizations,
and employment agencies.II The. Act contains a statutory defense to all facially discriminatory practices (except those practices which discriminate on the basis of race): the bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).II The Act, however, is silent as
15.ld.
16.ld.
17. ld. at 1274.
18. ld. at 1285-86.
19.1d.
20. 42 U.s.C. §§ 2000a to 2000h(6) (1976) (amended 1978).
21. ld. § 2000e-2. For relevent text of § 2000e-2, see note 1 supra.
22. ld. § 2000e-2(e) reads in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter,
(1) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his
religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances
where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busineBB or enterprise . . . .
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to how other forms of discrimination may be proved and what
defenses may be interposed by the defendant.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., lIS the Supreme Court held that
facially neutral policies which have a disparate impact on blacks
violate Title VII regardless of the employers intent, and that
such practices may only be defended on the grounds that they
bear a manifest relationship to the employment in question. In
Griggs, black employees alleged that the employer's use of standardized intelligence tests and a high school diploma requirement had an unlawfully discriminatory impact on Blacks and
thereby violated Title VII.I. The Court agreed, holding that the
plaintiff need not prove the employer intended to discriminate,
and that the congressional intent in enacting Title VII was to
eliminate employment practices which "operate as 'built-in
headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring
job capability."1II
The defendant in Griggs argued that the express language
of section 703(h) of the Act should be interpreted to require
proof of an intent to discriminate in testing cases." Rejecting
this argument, the Court reasoned that Congress' intent was to
prohibit "not only overt discrimination but also practices that
are fair in form, but discriminatory in practice."17 The Court
held "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."11
Subsequently, in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,'· the
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. Id. at 426.
25. Id. at 432.
26. Id. at 433. Section 703(h) of the Act reads in pertinent part:
[Njor shall it be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed,
intended or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin . . . .
42. U.S.C. § 200Qe-2(h) (1976).
27. 401 U.S. at 431. The Court relied upon a memorandum circulated by Senators
Case and Clark which dealt with the question of whether Title VII mandated the lowering of an employee's qualifications. Id. at 436.
28. Id. at 432 (Burger, C.J.).
29. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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Court refined these theories of the plaintiff's and the defendant's burdens of proof in disparate impact cases. The 'Albemarle plaintiffs alleged that the defendant's employment testing program had a disparate impact on black employees. 8o In
discussing the order· and burden of proof, the Court stated that
the plaintiffs had made a "prima facie case of discrimination,
i.e., had shown that the tests [or policies] in question select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly
different from that of the pool of applicants."11 Once the plaintiff has established the prima facie case, the defendant may justify the practice as a business necessity by showing "that a given
requirement has a manifest relationship to the employment in
question."aJ For a defendant to satisfy the business necessity defense in a testing case, the exam must be "shown by professionally acceptable methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
comprise or are relevant to the job for which candidates are being evaluated."sa If the employer successfully establishes the defense, the plaintiff has the burden of proving that "other tests or
selection devices, without a similar undesirable. . . effect, would
also serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and
trustworthy workmanship."14
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
what must be proved to meet the manifest relationship standard, most courts have adopted the formulation for proof of the
business necessity defense enunciated by the Fourth Circuit in
Robinson v. Lorillard. sa Robinson requires the defendant to
prove that:
[T]here exists an overriding legitimate business
purpose such that the practice is necessary to the
safe and efficient operation of the business. Thus,
the business purpose must be sufficiently compel.
ling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business
purpose it is alleged to serve ...."
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

[d. at 409.
[d. at 425.
[d.
[d. at 434.
[d.
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.). cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
ld. at 798. Most of the circuit courts have adopted this formulation for proving
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Both the proof of and the defense to allegations that Title
VII protected groups have intentionally been treated differently
have taken a wholly different route. The Supreme Court first
announced the elements and allocation of the burden of proof in
such cases in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,S? clarifying it
most recently in Texas Department of Community Affairs v.
Burdine. ss To 'prove that a defendant intentionally treated the
plaintiff differently because of his or her status as a member of a
group protected under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove that he
or she: (1) belongs to a group protected by Title VII; (2) applied
for and was qualified for a job, for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) was rejected despite the plaintiff's qualifications; and, (4) after the rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to solicit applications from persons
of the plaintiff's qualifications. ae Once the plaintiff has made
this relatively simple showing, an inference of discrimination is
raised which can be rebutted merely by the defendant "articulating some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason f6r plaintiff's
rejection."40 If the defendant succeeds in this endeavor, the
plaintiff then has the heavy burden of proving that the defendant's proferred reason for plaintiff's rejection is a mere pretext
for discrimination. 41 Thus, in contrast to the rigorous business
the business necessity defense. See Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist., 641
F.2d 835, 841 (10th Cir. 1981); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696, 705 n.6 (8th
Cir. 1980); Palmer v. General Mills, Inc., 513 F.2d 1040, 1044 (6th Cir. 1975); Muller v.
United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923, 929 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825
(1975); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 246 (5th Cir. 1974), acq.
in result 576 F.2d 1157 (1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1115 (1979); United States v. St.
Louis·San Francisco Ry. Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir., 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1116 (1973); United States v. International Longshoreman Ass'n, 460 F.2d 497, 504 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1007 (1972); United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451
F.2d 418, 451 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
37. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
38. 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
39. 411 U.S. at S02. See Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 101 S. Ct. at
1094 n.6. In Burdine, the Court said plaintiff's prima facie burden is "not onerous." Id.
at 1094.
40. 411 U.S. at 802-03. The presumption of discrimination is rebutted if "the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
plaintiff .... The defendant must clearly set forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection." 101 S. Ct. at 1094. "The defendant
need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proferred reasons." Id.
(emphasis added).
41. 411 U.S. at SOl, 804. The Burdine Court articulated two ways in which a plaintiff may show pretext: "either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory
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necessity defense to disparate impact cases, the defendant in
disparate treatment cases has a minimal burden of proving some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection.
Both disparate· impact and disparate treatment cases involve practices which, on their face, are not violations of Title
VII. Facial discrimination under Title VII gives rise only to the
aforesaid statutory BFOQ defense and is never permissible lD
cases involving racial discrimination.·l.l
In Dothard v. Robinson,42 the Court found that, although
the state of Alabama expressly discriminated against women in
its assignment of correctional counselors to maximum security
prisons, this practice was justified as a BFOQ.48 The Dothard
Court, while citing lower court opinions on the burden of proof
needed to satisfy the BFOQ test,·· held that the BFOQ exception "provides only the narrowest of exceptions to the general
rule requiring equality of employment opportunities ... [and]
that it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual ... 'on the basis of stereotyped characterizations."411
The Ninth Circuit, in both Harriss and Blake v. City of Los
Angeles,·' adopted the long accepted formulation of the proof
element of the business necessity defense in disparate impact
cases as set out in Robinson. Yet, Ninth Circuit panels in Conreason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's
proferred explanation is unworthy of credence." 101 S. Ct. at 1095.
41.1 Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650,652 (5th Cir.),
cert. den.ied, 449 U.S. 891 (1980); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2e (1976).
42. 433 U.S. 321 (1977). In addition to the per se discrimination analysis in
Dothard, the Court found the state's height and weight requirements Cor prison guards
had a discriminatory impact on women. Id. at 330. The Court then refined the "touchstone" language of Griggs to mean "a discriminatory employment practice must be
shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge." Id. at 332 n.14.
43. Id. at 333. For the text of § 2000e-2(e) which provides for the BFOQ defense, see
note 22 supra.
44. The Court cited the BFOQ exception as formulated by the Fifth Circuit in Diaz
v. Pan Am. World Airways, 442 F.2d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 1971) and Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
45. 433 U.S. at 333.
46. 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. den.ied, 446 U.S. 928 (1980) (plaintiff
challenged defendant's height and weight requirements for employment in the city police
department on the basis of sex discrimination).
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treras, Craig v. County of Los Angeles"n and deLaurier v. San
Diego Unified School District 48 have adopted a different formu-

lation called the job-relatedness approach. Under this job-relatedness approach, the Ninth Circuit has held that the "manifest
relationship" standard of Griggs is "met with less than proof of
absolute necessity [by the employer)."·8 This may be one reason
why the defense is being diluted in the Ninth Circuit.

C.

THE

Harriss

OPINION

The Majority

The Harriss court began by deciding that the defendant's
stop-work policy was justified as a business necessity.llo The
court initially found the policy constituted a prima facie violation of Title VUIiI because flight attendants were barred from
employment after the notification of pregnancy and for at least
sixty days after delivery. IIi Nevertheless, the court found that
the airline's interest in safety overcame any discriminatory im47. 626 F.2d 659, 662 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 1364 (1981). In Craig,
plaintiff attacked defendant's use of two written examinations and minimum height requirements for employment by the county sheriff's department as discriminating against
Mexican-Americans. Id. at 661. Holding that a single written examination and the height
requirement violated Title VII, the Ninth Circuit found no evidence that either the written test or the height requirements were job related. Id. at 663.
48. 588 F.2d 674, 678 (9th Cir. 1978). In deLaurier, plaintiff challenged defendant's
policy requiring that she go on leave at the beginning of her ninth month of pregnancy.
Id. at 675. The Ninth Circuit held that the policy was sufficiently related to the goal of
educational efficiency. Id. at 680. For an analysis of deLaurier, see 10 GOLDEN GATE U.L.
REV. 39 (1980).
49. Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d at 1276 (quoting deLaurier v. San
Diego Unified School Dist., 588 F.2d at 678). For excellent discussions of the theoretical
basis for the business necessity defense, see Comment, The Business Necessity Defense
to Disparate Impact Liability Under Title Vll, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 926-30 (1976) and
Note, Business Necessity Under Title Vll of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A No-Alternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 102, 106 (1974).
50. 649 F.2d at 676. The district court's opinion in Harriss, 437 F. Supp. 413 (1977),
is analytically confused. The analysis used by the Harriss trial court mixes the three
Title VII theories of discrimination, and their defenses. See id. at 430-36. The district
court held that both the stop· work policy and the start-work policy constituted prima
facie violations of Title VII, under the theory of disparate treatment. Id. at 425-30. However, the court held that these policies were justified as either a business necessity or a
BFOQ. Id. at 432-35. The court further found that the seniority policy did not violate
Title VII. Id. at 438. The court based its holdings on the possibility of incapacitation,
due to pregnancy-related illness to flight attendants, the important goal of airline safety,
and the possibility of a conflict of interest between passenger safety and the protection
of the flight attendant's unborn child in the case of emergency. Id. at 420-25.
51. 649 F.2d at 674.
52. Id. at 672.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5

52

Kirk et al.: Constitutional Law

1982J

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

77

pact, that pregnancy would possibly affect the ability to perform
emergency functions and that the risk, discounted by the gravity
of the harm, justified the airline's policy.&S In finding the stopwork policy justified, the Ninth Circuit applied the burden of
proof test enunciated in Blake,&4 which in turn had adopted the
approach announced in Robinson.
In considering the defendant's start-work policy under its
pre-amendment analysis, the Ninth Circuit panel found that the
policy restricted a pregnant woman's employment opportunities,
thereby having a discriminatory impact on women in violation of
Title VIV~II The Harriss court noted that the district court had
made no findings on either the risk to passengers in allowing
flight attendants to return to work earlier than sixty days after
birth" or the necessity of the start-work policy in light of that
risk. 17 The Ninth Circuit remanded Harriss for further factual
findings as to whether the policy could be justified as a business
necessity."
As for the seniority policy, however, the Ninth Circuit reversed. II' The district court had determined that Pan Am's seniority policy did not violate Title VII. The Ninth Circuit panel
reasoned that workers who received other medical leaves were
not penalized by loss of seniority. The court held that the policy
disproportionately burdened women and constituted a prima facie violation of Title VII.eo The court then remanded the case
for further findings as to the business necessity of the policy.81
53. Id. at 675.
54. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1376 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 928 (1980).
55. 649 F.2d at 677.
56.ld.
57.ld.
58. Id. at 678.
69. Id. at 679.
6O.ld.
61. Id. In the post-amendment analysis, the Harriss Court concluded that the stop·
work policy was a per se violation of Title VII but was justified as a BFOQ. rd. at 676.
The court adopted the formulation of the burden of proof used by the Fifth Circuit in
Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976). The Usery Court laid
down a two-part test in that the employer must show that the BFOQ involved is reason·
ably neceB881'y to the essence of its business and the employer has a reasonable cause, a
factual basis, for believing that all or substantially all of the class of people in question
would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it
is impossible or impractical to deal with persons on an individual basis. 1d. at 235-36_
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The Dissent
The Harriss dissent attacked the majority for accepting the
defendant's assertion that passenger safety adequately justified
its stop-work policy.8lI Because "the airline makes no attempt to
prevent flight attendants .with other potentially disabling conditions from flying,"es the dissent argued, the stop-work policy advanced no valid goal of passenger safety and, therefore, was not
a business necessity.e. The dissent argued that after finding both
the stop-work and seniority policies violative of Title VII, the
court should not have remanded for further findings. ell
Arguing that the start-work policy should be invalidated as
discriminatory, the dissent stated that there was no "factual basis for finding that women are unable to perform their duties
until 60 days after childbirth .... [N]or has the employer
shown why it does not make individual determinations concerning a woman's ability to return to work before 60 days.'''
Finally, the dissent argued that the defendant did not "attempt to justify the [seniority policy] as a business necessity.''''
In light of the 1978 pregnancy amendment to Title VII,ea the
remand to the district court is predestined to invalidate the
policy."

D.

THE

Contreras

OPINION

The Majority
In Contreras,70 the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
The Ninth Circuit held that defendant's start-work policy and the seniority policy were
per se violations of Title VII and remanded the issues to the district court to determine
whether the policies could be justified as a BFOQ. 649 F.2d at 678-79.
62. 649 F.2d at 679 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 680. As examples of these physical conditions the dissent cited ulcers, high
blood pressure, colitis, hernias, and heart disease. Id.
64.Id.
65. Id. at 681. At trial, two physicians testified as to when a post-partum examination should occur to determine when a woman could return to work after delivery. One
doctor placed the time at 28 days (four weeks), the other at 42 days (six weeks). Id.
66.Id.
67.Id.
68. For pertinent text of the amendment, see note 5 supra.
69. 649 F.2d at 681.
70. 656 F.2d 1267 (9th Cir. 1981). The district court's opinion in Contreras may be
found at 18 Fair Empl. Cas. (BNA) 80 (C.D. Cal. 1977). However, the trial court's opin-
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ruling that the plaintiffs had failed to prove prima facie violations of Title VII with respect to the senior accountant's examination.'11 The district court held that statistical evidence of discriminatory impact, "although [showing] disparate [impact],
[was] not statistically significant when tested at a .05 level of
significance, "'71 and that, because the plaintiffs had failed to
study seriously for the examination, they had not proved a
prima facie case of discrimination. Upholding the lower court
ruling, the Ninth Circuit said that because of the small sample
size,'18 and evidence that the plaintiffs had not properly prepared
for the examination, the district court's ruling against the plaintiff was not clearly erroneous under United States v. Yellow Cab
Co. '7.
As for the auditor's examination, the appellate court found
clear error and reversed the district court's determination that
the plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory impact.'1I The Ninth Circuit found the district court
improperly combined the statistics of a separate senior auditor's
examination with those of the auditor's examination to prove
there was no disproportionate impact on Spanish surnamed
applicants.'11

Consequently, the burden shifted to the defendant to prove
that the auditor's examination was sufficiently job-related to
meet the business necessity defense requirements. The Conion is devoid of any reference to the business necessity defense and primarily discusses
the validation of the two allegedly discriminatory tests for their job· relatedness.
71. 656 F.2d at 1274.
72. rd. at 1272.
73. Only 17 Spanish surnamed applicants took the senior accountant's examination.
rd. at 1273.
74. rd. at 1274. "lWlhere the evidence would support a conclusion either way but
where the triaI court has decided it to weigh more heavily for the defendantl,l ... a
choice between two permissible views of the weight of evidence is not 'clearly errone·
ous.''' United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 338 U.S. 338, 342 (1949).
75. 656 F.2d at 1275. For discussions of the problems of statistical proof in Title VII
cases, see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59 (1973); Hallock, The Numbers
Game-The Use and Misuse of Statistics in Civil Rights Litigation, 23 VILL. L. REV. 5
(1977); Note, Beyond the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Law; Statis·
tical Proof and Rebuttal, 89 HARv. L. REv. 387 (1975); Note, Statistics and Title VII
Proof: Prima Facie Case and Rebuttal, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1030 (1978).
76. 656 F.2d at 1274-75.
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treras court found that the defendant had met its burden77 and
that the plaintiffs failed to prove a less discriminatory alternative was available to the defendant."

In constructing a test for the business necessity defense, the
Contreras court sought to "harmonize the [Ninth Circuit]
cases. "79 The court found that deLaurier and Craig applied a
job relatedness standard which "mandate[d] employer color [or
sex] blindness, but otherwise respects an employer's right to
seek maximum employee productivity and efficiency."8o In contrast, Blake allowed practices or tests only when it can be
proved that not allowing these devices would seriously injure the
defendant. 81 To resolve the dispute, the Contreras court analyzed the same legislative pronouncements analyzed by the Supreme Court in Griggs. 81
The Contreras court found that "the legislative history of
Title VII clearly reveals that Congress was concerned about preserving employer freedom, and that it acted to mandate employer color [or sex] blindness with as little intrusion into the
free enterprise system as possible."ea Therefore, the court concluded that the less restrictive burden of proof required by
Craig and deLaurier is the appropriate test for business necessity.84 For further support, the Ninth Circuit panel cited New
York Transit Authority v. Beaze,.ae and Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine. 88 In Beazer, the Supreme Court
held that the defendant's policy of denying employment to
methadone 87 users was not racially discriminatory under Title
VII. 88 After finding that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient
evidence of disparate impact to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination,89 the Court reasoned that even if a prima facie
77. Id. at 1284.
78. Id. at 1285.
79. Id. at 1277.
SO.Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1277·78.
83. Id. at 1278.
84.Id.

85.
86.
87.
88.

440 U.S. 568 (1979).
101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981).
"Methadone" is used to treat heroin addiction. 440 U.S. at 573.
Id. at 587.
89. Id. at 584·87.

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5

56

Kirk et al.: Constitutional Law

1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

81

case was established, the policy could be justified as a business
necessity on the basis that "the [policy] bears a manifest relationship to the employment in question."90 The Contreras court
then held that the defendant's process for validating its examination met the Albemarle standard91 as to whether examinations
are a business necessity and that the plaintiffs had not shown
the existence of a less discriminatory alternative. 1II
The Dissent

The di~sent, while concurring in the result in Contreras,
disagreed with the panel's assertion that an intracircuit split for
the burden of proof for the business necessity defense existed. 98
Attacking the majority, the dissent argued that the Blake court
implicitly followed the Ninth Circuit decisions in Craig and deLaurier because it deleted the phrase "necessity connotes an· irresistible demand .... [A practice] must not only directly foster safety and efficiency . . . but must also be essential to those
goals."M Because the Blake court did not define necessity as being irresistible, as do other circuit courts, the dissent concluded
that Blake was consistent with Craig and deLaurier. ell
In addition, the dissent argued that if Blake had required
proof that the employment practice was absolutely necessary to
the business purpose, it would shift the plaintifrs burden of
proving the availability of a less discriminatory alternative into
the defendant's business necessity defense." This shift in burden, the dissent maintained, would be contrary to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Dothard9'1 and Albemarle Paper." The dissent contended that "(1) ... the 'necessity' language in
Dothard excludes consideration of less discriminatory alternatives as part of the employer's proof; and (2) any discussion of
alternatives during judicial review of the employer's burden of
proof centers on more efficient alternatives, and not, necessarily,
90. [d. at 587 n.31.
91. 422 U.S. at 431.
92. 656 F.2d at 1284-85.
93. [d. at 1286 (Tang, J., dissenting).
94. [d. at 1289 (quoting United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662
(2d Cir. 1971».
95. 656 F.2d at 1290.
96. [d.
97. See notes 42·45 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

57

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5

82

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:68

on less discriminatory alternatives."911 Finally, the dissent argued
that because "the district court committed legal error by requiring [defendant to] supply 'competent and relevant evidence' on
the issue of the job relatedness of their employment standard,
. . . [he] would remand the case with instructions to reevaluate
the evidence under the proper legal standard."loo The dissent
reasoned that because of the district court's erroneous concept
of the law, the clearly erroneous standard should not be used.

E.

ANALYSIS

The conflict within the Ninth Circuit over the proper formulation of the burden of proof for the business necessity defense should be resolved in favor of the Robinson standard,lol
developed in the Fourth Circuit and adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Harriss lO" and Blake. loa This burden of proof standard is
consistent with congressional intent and the Supreme Court
opinions in Griggs, Albermarle, and Dothard.
In the legislative debates accompanying the enactment of
Title VII, the intent of Congress was to allow efficient business
policies to continue, and to balance this policy with the goal of
equal employment opportunity. 11M Cases which had adopted the
Robinson approach have balanced these goals. loa These cases
strike down the employment practice only if (1) the practice is
not related to job performance l" or (2) an alternative policy exists, without the discriminatory impact, which serves the business policy better or equally as well.1o'J
99. 656 F.2d at 1291. This argument seema whimsical in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. II. Green, discuaaed at text accompanying
notes 37·41 supra.
100. 656 F.2d at 1293-94.
101. For a discussion of the Robinson standard, see notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
102. 649 F.2d at 670.
103. 595 F.2d at 1376.
104. Congress expressly considered the court's decision in Griggs, and clearly approved the decision, indicating that the Court's focus on the predictiveness of a business
policy to job performance was correct. H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st· Sess. 8, 21
(1971); S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1971); 177 CONGo REC. (1971) (re~arks
of Rep. Perkins).
105. For a list of cases adopting the Robinson approach, see note 36 supra.
106. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
107. See notes 112·117 infra and accompanying text.
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The job-relatedness approach does not balance these legislative goals. In Contreras, the court held that "discriminatory
tests are impermissible unless shown by professionally accepted
method, to be predictive of, or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior ... to the job for which candidates are being evaluated. mo8 This formulation of the burden
of proof tolerates a disparate impact on protected individuals
even though other job-related policies are at least as efficient as
the challenged policy. The job-related policy does not carry out
the balancing mandated by Congress. 10e
The Contreras court's reliance on dictum in Beazer is misplaced. Beazer involved drug use, the effects of which on an individual cannot readily be determined by tests which may be
given by an employer. The plaintiff in Beazer failed to show that
a feasible alternative was available to the defendant and is not a
case which adopts the job-relatedness approach to the business
necessity defense.
In trying to further support its interpretation of Title VII,
the Contreras court unfortunately cited the Supreme Court's
Burdine decision. Burdine involved allegations of discrimination
through disparate treatment, while Contreras dealt with employment practices which allegedly have a disparate impact on
groups protected by Title VII. As noted earlier, these two theories are not sufficiently analogous to lend support to each
other. no Because of this incompatibility with the congressional
intent of Title VII, the Contreras formulation of the burden of
proof for the business necessity defense should be rejected.
The Harriss court adopted the correct formulation for the
business necessity defense and then misapplied the standard. In
Harriss, the court ignored the final portion of the Robinson
standard. 111
For example, in Burwell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,UI the
108. 656 F.2d at 1332.
109. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
110. See notes 23-41 supra and accompanying text.
111. For a discussion of the Robinson standard, see notes 35-36 supra and accompanying text.
112. 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
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Fourth Circuit faced a situation analogous to that in Harriss.
The Burwell court, in a per curiam opinion, found that Eastern's
policy of requiring pregnant flight attendants to take maternity
leave immediately upon learning of the pregnancy was not a
business necessity during the first thirteen weeks of pregnancy.
To reach this conclusion, the Burwell court relied on essentially
the same medical evidence as did the Harriss panel. ll8 The
Burwell court concluded that the defendant had not met its burden of proof under Robinson. Consequently, Burwell holds that
the mandatory leave policy is justified from the fourteenth week
of pregnancy until the birth of the child. 114 The dissent11ll argued
that the plaintiff had rebutted the existence of the business necessity defense when she showed that defendant had an alternative business practice available, which accomplished the business
purpose equally as well. lie The dissent urged that the lower
court ruling, which stated that a business necessity did not exist
until after the twenty-eighth week of pregnancy, was supported
by the evidence and should not be reversed.ll7
Burwell presents two less onerous alternative policies to the
harsh result in Harriss. Both the thirteenth week and the
twenty-eighth week stopping point for flight attendants would
serve the health and safety concerns of the businesses involved
without the detrimental economic impact an immediate "stopwork" has on flight attendants and their families.

If there is a trend emerging from Harriss and Contreras, it
may be that the Ninth Circuit is willing to defer to the policies
113. The court noted that many of the experts who testified in Burwell have testified in similar cases. [d. at 367.
114. [d. at 372.
115. [d. at 373 (Butzner, J., concurring and dissenting).
116. [d. at 375.
117. Northwest Airlines permits flight attendants to work until the 28th week of
pregnancy upon medical certification of their ability to work. [d. at 376. Subsequently,
Eastern Airlines adopted the same policy after the district court's decision in Burwell.
The partial dissent also noted that Eastern allows flight attendants, with the supervision
of their medical department, to fly with controlled diabetes and epilepsy, even though
medical experts at trial testified that the conditions were "more likely to be disabling
than pregnancy." [d. Finally, the dissent said that defendant's "normal method of handling physical and mental disabilities, other than pregnancy, is to rely upon self-monitoring." [d.
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of organizations which have a strong concern for safety.
F.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit has not, after twelve years of litigation,
settled on a standard for the business necessity defense. The
Harriss and Blake courts have adopted the correct Robinson
formulation for the business necessity defense. However, the
Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Harriss and Contreras shows how
easily Title VII is misinterpreted and misapplied. These mistakes make it easier for employers to discriminate freely without
facing the consequences. Without stronger direction from the
Supreme Court in the area of the business necessity defense, the
intent of Title VII will never fully be achieved.
James D. Fisher

IV. ESCHEWING THE FAT: FLIGHT ATTENDANT
WEIGHT REQUIREMENTS AND TITLE VII

A.

INTRODUCTION

In Gerdom u. Continental Airlines, Inc.,! the Ninth Circuit
held that (1) the airlines' weight requirements for flight attendants do not constitute unlawful sex discrimination under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Action the theory of disparate impact on
women; (2) remand was appropriate to allow plaintiffs an opportunity to establish a violation under the disparate treatment
theory; and (3) the district court abused its discretion in refusing to certify the class action.
Until 1973, defendant Continental Airlines hired only
female flight attendants and required them to maintain their
weight below the maximum limits published in a height/weight
charlo In 1973, the defendant began hiring a limited number of
men as flight attendants. 8 Continental also modified its weight
1. 648 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Sneed, J.; the other panel members were
Soloman, D.J., sitting by designation; and Schroeder, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
2. Subchapter VI of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 701.718, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
3. The airlines' change in hiring policy resulted from the Fifth Circuit decision in
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 950
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requirements so that flight attendants would maintain their
weight in a reasonable relationship to their height, bone structure and age. 4
Plaintiff Gerdom, a female flight attendant, was terminated
in 1971 for exceeding her maximum weight." She sued Continental and the Air Line Pilots' Association (the Association) in 1972
claiming unlawful sex discrimination. The court dismissed the
suit against the Association in 1973. The Association then sued
Continental on behalf of flight attendants suspended or terminated for exceeding the weight limits.· The two suits were consolidated and, in 1977, the Union of Flight Attendants became
the bargaining representative for the affected employees andreplaced the Association as a plaintiff. 7 The plaintiffs challenged
both the pre-1973 and post-1973 weight requirements.
The trial court granted the defendant's summary judgment
motion and the plaintiffs appealed. 8 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the lower court's finding that the airline's weight requirements
had no adverse impact on women, but remanded the case to the
trial court to determine the issue of disparate treatment which
the lower court had failed to address. It also reversed the trial
court's denial of plaintiff's motion to certify a class.
B.

BACKGROUND

Section 703(a) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (the Act) proscribes employment discharges based on an individual's sex.' The
(1971). Diaz held that a policy of hiring only women as flight attendants was not a bona
fide occupational qualification and violated Title VII. Id. at 388-89. Men presently remain a small minority in this job category. As of 1974, only two percent of Continental's
flight attendants were men. 648 F.2d at 1225.
4. 648 F.2d at 1225.
5. Gerdom was terminated March 22, 1971 because she exceeded her maximum
weight for 90 days. She was 5' 5W' tall and weighed 146'h pounds-13 pounds above
her allowed maximum. She had previously been suspended eight times without pay for
exceeding her maximum weight requirement. Id.
6.Id.
7.Id.
8. Gerdom v. Continental Air Lines, Inc., 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 6051 (C.D.
Cal. 1976).
9. Section 703(a) of the Act provides: "It shall be an unlawful employment practice
for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex .... n 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (1976).
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primary purpose of the Act is to insure equality of employment
opportunities and to eliminate racial barriers.lO The legislative
history accompanying the amendment adding "sex" to Title VII
is meager at best. The sex discrimination provisions were added
to the Act only one day before the House approved Title VIIu
and was offered as a floor amendment without any prior legislative hearing or debate. The limited floor discussion lasted only
an hour and added little substance to clarify the intended scope
of the amendment. 11 Ironically, Representative Howard Smith of
Virginia, an outspoken opponent of the Act, introduced the
amendment and was later accused by one commentator of trying
to sabotage the Act by his proposal. 18
Because of the scant history, some courts have inferred that
Congress did n9t intend the ban on sex discrimination to have
"significant and sweeping implications. "14 However, attempts to
modify Title VII by including age as an impermissible employment factorlll and to weaken the sex amendment by prohibiting
only discrimination based "solely" on sex have failed. 18 By the
time of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,1'f Congress made clear that it intended to fight sex discrimination as
vigorously as other prohibited forms of discrimination. IS
10. "The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the lan·
guage of the statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an jdentifiable group of white employees
over other employees." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429·30 (1971).
11. Willingham v. Macon Tel Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975);
Binder, Sex Discriminaton in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High, 59 CALIP. L.
REv. 1091, 1092·93 (1971); DelJelopments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the CilJil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971); Comment,
Flights Attendant Weight Requirements and Title VII of the CilJil Rights Act of 1964,
45 J. AIR L. & COM. 483, 485 (1980).
12. Comment, supra note 11, at 485.
13.ld.
14. See, e.g., Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir.
1975).
15. Comment, supra note 11, at 486 n.11.
16. Id. n.12.
17. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1976» (amending the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
18. See Comment, supra note 11, at 486 n.1S. The Report of the House Generai
Sub-Committee on Labor stated:
Women are subject to economic deprivation as a class.
Their self-fulfillment and development is frustrated because of
their sex....
Such blatantly disparate treatment is particularly objec-
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Two legal theories may support a plaintiff's Title VII claim:
disparate impact and disparate treatment. le Each theory dictates a different method of proof.

Disparate Impact Theory
Disparate impact, also known as adverse impact, focuses on
the consequences of the alleged discriminatory employment
practice. The leading case, Griggs u. Duke Power CO.,IO involved
the use of educational and intellectual employment requirements which excluded more blacks than whites from certain job
categories. Because the requirements were neither job-related
nor necessary for success in the positions being filled,ll the
Griggs Court found the employment criteria racially discriminatory. The Court held that job qualifications "must have a manifest· relationship to the employment in question"SS and "must
measure the person for the job and not the person in the
abstract. "sa
Whereas Griggs concerned racial discrimination under Title
VII, Dothard u. Rawlinsonl • involved height and weight requirements for women employees in the Alabama prison system. The
requirements excluded forty percent of the female population
but only one percent of the male population from positions in
the prison system. The Court found the requirements violated
Title VII in those circumstances where they excluded women
from certain jobs not involving direct contact with male
prisoners. III
tionable in view of the fact that Title VII has specifically pro·
hibited sex discrimination since its enactment in 1964. . . .
. .. [D)iscrimination against women continues to be
widespread, and is regarded by many as either morally or
physiologically justifiable.
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in (1972) U.S. CODE CONGo &: AD.
NEWS 2140-41.
19. Golden V. Local 55, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817, 820-21 (9th Cir.
1980); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw, 1153-54, 1158
(1976). A third theory, present effects of past discrimination, will not be discussed since
only the first two theories were at issue in Gerdom.
20. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
21. ld. at 429-33.
22. ld. at 432.
23. ld. at 436.
24. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
25. ld. at 331-32.
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Both decisions illustrate that, under the disparate impact
theory, a plaintiff need only show that facially neutral standards
actually result in a significantly discriminatory pattern of hiring
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden
then shifts to the employer to show that the requirement manifestly relates to the employment. Ie If the employer meets this
burden, the plaintiff must then show that other selection criteria
would serve the employer's legitimate business needs without
the discriminatory impact.17 Because courts focus on the consequences of the employment practice, they do not require proof
of discriminatory intent, only discriminatory effect.s8
Flight attendants have unsuccessfully challenged airline
weight requirements under the disparate impact theory.se In
Dothard, the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of sex discrimination because the Alabama prison system's combined
height and weight restrictions excluded 41.13% of the female
population but less than 1 % of the male population. ao Flight attendants have had a difficult time proving statistically any disparate impact of the weight requirements. In Jarrell v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc.,81 weight limits which differed for male and female
flight attendants would admit only 33.3 % of the general female
population and 43.5 % of the general male population. The court
held these statistical differences insufficient to establish prima
facie evidence of disparate impact. as Present airline weight requirements are close to these ratios. aa Therefore, a statistical approach to proving the disparate impact of airline weight requirements would likely fail.
26. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432.
27. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
28. "Title VII is not concerned with the employer's 'good intent or absence of discriminatory intent' for 'Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation.''' Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 422 (1975) (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 432).
29. Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Janel v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir.
1978); COl[ v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976),
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977).
30. 433 U.S. at 329-30.
31. 430 F. Supp. 884 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd, 577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
32. Id. at 889-90. This conclusion was reaffirmed in Leonard v. National Airlines,
Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269, 275 (S.D. Fla. 1977) where only 22% of the female population
would meet the weight standards as opposed to 30% of the male population.
33. See Comment, supra note 11. at 492-94.
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Jarrell further supported the courts' reluctance to find disparate impact in flight attendant cases. Because the flight attendant is an overwhelmingly female-dominated job classification, the airlines' weight and other restrictions have not barred
employment opportunities for women. 14 If anything, the recent
past has been marked by sex discrimination against males,11 and
male flight attendants remain a minority. Therefore, some courts
refuse to find that employment requirements discriminate
against women in occupations where only women are employed.
For example, in Stroud v. Delta Airlines, Inc.,ae the Fifth Circuit held that where only women occupy positions as flight attendants, a no-marriage rule of the employer does not discriminate on the basis of sex.

Courts have also looked upon the airlines' weight requirements as a part of an overall grooming program or personal appearance policy," allowing the employer to impose reasonable
personal appearance requirements on its employees. The standards may also differ between male and female employees."
However, grooming standards which distinguish between men
and women on the basis of "immutable characteristics" or "fundamental rights" do violate Title VII.I'
The Ninth Circuit in Baker v. California Land Title CO.40
34. Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 892-93 (E.D. Va. 1977), off'd,
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
.
35. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971).
36. 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
37. Jarrell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 884, 891-92 (E.D. Va. 1977), off'd,
577 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978).
38. "There is virtual unanimity among the Circuit Courts or Appeals that an employer may impose reasonable personal appearance requirements upon its employees and
such standards need not be identical for· males and females. Such practices are said to be
non-sexually discriminating." rd. at 891. See 0"0 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing
Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091-92 (5th Cir. 1975).
39. Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1091 (5th Cir. 1975).
See also Earwood v. Continental Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349, 1351 (4th Cir.
1976):
[D)iscrimination based on either immutable 88X characteristics
or constitutionally protected activities such as marriage or
child rearing violate [Title VII) because they present obstacles
to employment of one 88X that cannot be overcome. On the
other hand, discrimination based on factors of personal preference does not necessarily restrict employment opportunities
and thus is not forbidden.
40. 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol12/iss1/5

66

Kirk et al.: Constitutional Law

1982]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

91

found hair length restrictions for male employees not discriminatory within the meaning of Title VII because hair length was
not an immutable characteristic.n Baker was followed by the
Fifth Circuit's decision in Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing CO.,41 which reB.ects the present state of the law on
grooming standards. The employer in Willingham refused to
hire an applicant because of his shoulder length hair. The Fifth
Circuit concluded that Congress intended equal employment opportunity could best be secured by prohibiting employers from
discriminating between men and women on the basis of immutable characteristics or fundamental rights. U The court found hair
length neither immutable nor constitutionally protected44 and
that such grooming codes reflected the employer's right to control his or her business rather than a denial of equal
opportunity.411
Except for Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,4e courts have
upheld flight attendant weight requirements on the grounds that
weight is neither an immutable characteristic nor a fundamental
right. 4 ' In Laffey, decided prior to Willingham, the airlines
hired male pursers whose jobs, for purposes of Title VII, were
substantially equal and similarly situated to those of female
flight attendants. The airlines, however, paid pursers higher salaries, allowed them more expensive layover accommodations,
provided an allowance to maintain their uniforms, and did not
41. Id. at 897.
42. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
43. Id. at 1091.
44.1d.
45.1d.
46. 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
47. In Cox v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 14 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 4962 (S.D. Fla. 1976),
aff'd mem., 553 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1977), a female flight attendant claimed she was unable
to reduce her weight to the employer's allowable maximum because of inherent female
characteristics. The court analogized these weight restrictions to hair length restrictions
and held that Title VII does not protect classifications which result from grooming standards. Id. at 4963. In Jarrell, the court held that the airlines' weight program did not
violate Title VII by relying, in part, on the hair length cases. The court held that weight,
like hair, is a characteristic subject to the reasonable control of most individuals. 430 F.
Supp. at 892. In Leonard v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp. 269 (S.D. Fla. 1977), the
court upheld defendant's weight policy citing Willingham, Jarrell and COl:. Id. at 275. It
noted that Title VII is not intended to interfere with an employer's right to determine
how best to run his or her business. It held that weight is not an impermissible classification under Title VII because it is not immutable. Id.

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

67

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5

92

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:85

subject them to weight restrictions.·' The District of Columbia
Circuit found that the weight program was only one aspect of a
broad range of unequal treatment between the male pursers and
female flight attendants and held that the weight requirement
violated Title VII.

Disparate Treatment Theory
The disparate treatment theory of discrimination is what
Congress contemplated when it passed Title VII.·' It concerns
treating similarly situatedllO individuals differently because of
their race, sex, national origin or other prohibited criteria.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,II1 the Supreme Court
set out an order of proof for disparate treatment allegations. III In
McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that the complainant in a
Title VII action carries the initial burden under the statute to
establish a prima facie case of discrimination. III Complainant
Green alleged racial discrimination as the reason the corporation
refused to rehire him. He was able to establish prima facie discrimination by showing that: (1) he belonged to a racial minority; (2) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the corporation was seeking applicants; (3) despite his qualifications, he
was rejected; and, (4) after his rejection, the position remained
open and the corporation continued seeking applications from
persons with similar qualifications. &4
If the complainant establishes prima facie discrimination,

the burden shifts to the employer corporation "to articulate
some legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the employer's
rejection."11 In McDonnell Douglas, the corporation pointed to
complainant's past unlawful conduct against the corporation to
justify its refusal to rehire him. Such a showing sufficiently rebuts the prima facie case and shifts the burden to the complain48. 567 F.2d at 454.
49. See B. SCHLE! & P. GROSSMAN, Bupra note 19, at 15.
50. Id. at 16·17.
51. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
52. Although McDonnell Douglas addressed a private noncl888 action brought under
the disparate treatment theory, class actions would follow the same order and allocation
of proof. See B. SCRLE! & P. GROSSMAN. Bupra note 19, at 1157.
53. 411 U.S. at 802.
54.Id.
55.Id.
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ant to show that the employer's justification was pretextual. The
Court listed ways the complainant could meet this burden: He
could show that white employees engaged in the same activity
were retained or rehired, or he could present evidence of the corporation's treatment of him during his prior employment, the
corporation's reaction to his civil rights activities, or of the corporation's general policy and practice regarding minority
employment."
McDonnell Douglas articulated the three-step analysis that
courts presently apply to Title VII cases brought under the disparate treatment theory. Later decisions have clarified and refined that analysis. In McDonald v. Santa Fe Transportation
Co.,'" the Supreme Court interpreted McDonnell Douglas as requiring a showing that "race was a 'but for' cause" but not a
showing that race was the sole cause of the adverse action." In
Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,'9 the Supreme Court rejected the lower court's holding that in addition to showing a
legitimate purpose behind its hiring methods, the employer
must show those methods will allow consideration of the largest
number of minority applicants.eo The Court found that Title VII
does not impose a duty on the employer to adopt a hiring procedure which maximizes hiring minority employees.e1 In Board of
Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney,el the Supreme
Court clarified the meaning of "articulating" a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an employment practice. The Court
said this did not mean that the employer must "prove absence
of discriminatory motive''61 to meet its burden under Title VII.

Applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to sex discrimination claims, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case that
persons of one sex are treated differently from similarly situated
persons of the opposite sex and that no adequate explanation
exists for the different treatment." While the plaintiff retains
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

[d. at 804-05.
427 U.S. 273 (1976).
[d. at 282 n.10.
438 U.S. at 567 (1978).
[d. at 576·77.
[d. at 577-78.
439 U.S. 24 (1978).
[d. at 25.
Golden v. Local 55, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
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the burden of persuasion, the burden of production shifts to the
defendant employer to advance its reasons for treating male and
female employees differently. The plaintiff must then show that
the reasons were pretextual and that sex discrimination motivated the employment practice. Unlike disparate impact, the
disparate treatment theory of Title VII requires proof of intent.
The court will focus its inquiry on whether the employer premised the employment practices on sex. The motivation and intent of the employer will determine whether the articulated reasons for disparate treatment were pretextual. ell
In Laffey, the District of Columbia Circuit defined the standard for intent. e. The plaintiff in Laffey was a flight attendant
who alleged sex discrimination under the disparate treatment
theory. The employer admitted discriminatory treatment of
female flight attendants vis-a-vis male pursers and that the disparate treatment was based on sex, but defended its conduct as
unintentional. The court found that the Act requires only "a
general intent to discriminate" and "prohibits any discriminatory practice which was not merely accidental.'''' If" 'the defendant meant to do what he did'-there is no burden to show additional discriminatory motivation in order to recover under
Title VII."88
In Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc.," a stewardess contested, under the disparate treatment theory, the airline's nomarriage rule because the rule did not apply to male stewards.
The court held that the rule did not constitute a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) under section 703(e)(1) of the Act
and found for the plaintiff.'o The court noted that even if only
women occupied the position, the employer could not impose additional qualifications not imposed upon male employees unless
"that requirement reflects an inherent quality reasonably neces65. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1976); McDonnell Doug·
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 805 (1973); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 19, at
1163·54.
66. 667 F.2d at 454·66.
67. 1d. (citing Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkera v. United States, 416
F.2d 980, 995·97 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)).
68. 567 F.2d at 455 (quoting Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v.
United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)).
69. 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
70. 1d. at 1199.
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sary to satisfactory performance of the duties of stewardesses
"71

In summary, plaintiffs in flight attendant cases have argued
sex discrimination under the disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories. The disparate impact theory is less difficult
for a plaintiff to prove upon showing a prima facie case. No evidence need be presented regarding the employer's intent. However, case history indicates that courts have largely disfavored
this theory in challenges to flight attendant weight requirements. Courts are more receptive to arguments against weight
requirements under the disparate treatment theory which requires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.
C.

THE

COURT'S ANALYSIS

The Majority

The GerdoTn plaintiffs alleged sex discrimination under both
disparte impact and disparate treatment theories. The majority
first considered the plaint~s arguments that the airlines'
weight policy adversely affected women under the Griggs and
Dothard rationale and found the two cases inapplicable since
defendant's weight requirements did not exclude women as a
class from flight attendant positions. The majority referred to
Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 'II because, prior to 1972, the
weight policy did not restrict employment opportunities for wo. men inasmuch as only women were hired. The Gerdom court
stated that some women were excluded, but only on the basis of
weight.'III Because the plaintiffs did not allege that the airlines
enforced the requirements more strictly against female flight attendants than against male flight attendants, the majority affirmed the district court's dismissal of the adverse impact
Claim •'74
The majority then turned to the disparate treatment allegation. The court noted that the airline could impose weight standards on its employees with different requirements for men and
71.Id.
72. 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cit.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844 (1977).
73. 648 F.2d at 1226.
74. Id. at 1227.
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women, and relied on Baker v. California Land Title Co.,n a
grooming standards case. The Gerdom court also referred to the
decisions of other circuits which have reflected challenges to airline weight requirements to support its position. 'ut
The plaintiffs alleged that the director of passenger services
(DPS) and flight attendant positions were similarly situated.
They pointed out that DPS was a predominantly male position
subject to more lenient weight requirements which were more
leniently enforced than were those for flight attendants. Plaintiffs argued that DPSs, like flight attendants, were inflight personnel, were exposed to a great amount of public contact, and
often performed flight attendant duties."" The defendant argued
that the positions differed in the amount of public contact involved and functions performed.'78 The majority concluded that
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case that the DPS position was similar to that of the flight attendant, that one was
predominantly male and the other predominantly female, and
that the weight requirements for the jobs differed. TtI However,
because the district court failed to consider the plaintiffs' disparate treatment argument, the majority remanded the case so
that the lower court could resolve the remaining factual issues.
The majority instructed the lower court to determine whether
the duties between the two positions were so similar as to discredit any reason for disparate treatment in their weight
requirements. IO
The Dissent

Initially, the dissent agreed that the plaintiffs had shown a
prima facie case of discrimination.11 The dissent, however, disagreed with the majority's decision to remand the disparate
75. 507 F.2d 895 (9th Cu. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1046 (1975).
76. 648 F.2d at 1227. The majority also reversed the district court on the issue of
class certification. It found that the lower court abused its discretion in refusing to certify a class of flight attendants who had been terminated or lIuspended for violating defendant's weight requirement. Id. at 1228. This issue was not in controversy and will not
be discussed further in this Note.
77. Id. at 1227.
78. Id. at 1227·28. The defendant also contended that DPS was a management position while flight attendant was not.
79. Id. at 1228.
SO.ld.
81. ld. at 1229 (Schroeder, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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treatment issue because the defendant had had ample opportunity to justify its weight policy and the litigation was already too
protracted. 82 Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
approval of Stroud, a decision which the dissent found needlessly burdens the plaintiff who works in a segregated job.88
The dissent pointed out that the defendant imposed weight
requirements on women but not on men, even though both
served passengers during flights. As a result, women faced embarrassing weigh-ins, debilitating diets and reprisals for attempting to file suit. The dissent stated the weight requirements
bore no relation to ability to perform as a flight attendant and
that the airlines took no disciplinary action against male flight
attendants who exceeded their weight limits.··
The dissent rejected the notion that the airlines imposed
functionally similar grooming requirements on both men and
women, as was the case in Baker.1I The dissent criticized the
defendant's justifications for its weight policy. The defendant
asserted that the weight policy was a business judgment which
furthered the corporate image. Men were exempted because they
would advance to management rather than service positions.
The dissent believed the defendant's explanation served only to
highlight its discriminatory practices."
According to the dissent, the airline industry has historically exploited female sex appeal and discriminated against women on the basis of sex. The dissent pointed to such past discriminatory practices against female flight attendants as
mandatory retirement at age thirty-two or thirty-five and the
no-marriage rule. 87 Such a history of discrimination made suspect any business necessity argument raised by the employer."
The dissent also took issue with the majority's conclusion
that the weight restrictionS did not adversely affect women. In
effect, the majority found the suspension or termination of em82. Id. at 1229-30.
83. Id. at 1229.
84.Id.
85.Id.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88.Id.
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ployment was not adverse. 89 The dissent pointed out that the
Stroud approach would only preclude plaintiffs in segregated job
classifications from proving a prima facie case of discrimination.
To prevent such a harsh result, the dissent proposed a new theory: Whenever an employment requirement is applied to a segregated job classification and not to other employees, a prima facie
finding of discrimination should be found under either disparate
treatment or disparate impact analysis." The dissent then
adopted the rationale of the Sprogis' l court that if the employer
imposed an additional qualification upon one sex, that requirement would be valid only if it was reasonably necessary to perform the duties of the position in question.1I Under this proposed theory, the dissent believed the plaintiffs had proved their
case.

D.

CRITIQUE

Based on case law, the majority's decision to affirm the dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate impact claim was correct. While
the dissent took issue with this point, there is little to support
that position.
The majority mentioned the Fifth Circuit's Stroud decision
in its opinion, although the disposition of the case shows less
than a wholehearted approval of Stroud. By considering the disparate treatment claim, the Ninth Circuit has departed from
Stroud. The Stroud court ignored that aspect of the case before
it. Although there were no male flight attendants while Stroud
was employed, men in other job classes were excluded from the
marriage restriction. Yet, the court ignored this disparate treatment issue in its decision and held simply that because no men
were in the flight attendant field, no barrier to women's employment existed. Therefore, the discrimination was based on marital status, not sex. On the other hand, the Gerdom court looked
to the fact that men in other job classes, specifically the DPS,
were excluded from the employer's weight requirements. There89. [d. at 1230.
90. [d.
91. 444 F.2d at 1194.
92. [d. at 1199.
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fore, the Gerdom plaintiffs will be allowed the opportunity to
prove their case under this theory, which the plaintiff in Stroud
was not.
The dissent's criticism of Stroud is well taken in one other
respect. The Stroud court ignored the fact that the right to marriage is a fundamental right. Under the grooming standards
cases, such as the Fifth's Circuit's Willingham decision, the restriction against marriage presents a likely violation of Title VII
which the Gerdom court failed to address.
The dissent raised a valid point which, fortunately, the
Ninth Circuit was not forced to face in this case. Employees in
segregated jobs where the employer imposes an unlawful employment restriction will find it almost impossible to present a
prima facie case of discrimination under the present theoretical
framework. of Title VII. Their claims will not fit the disparate
impact theory, in part because they will be unable to show a
barrier to employment opportunities. Nor will their claims fit
the disparate treatment theory because they will be unable to
point to others similarly situated who are not similarly treated.
As the dissent warned, the unfortunate effect could be to motivate the employer to segregate the work force. The dissent has
suggested an inviting standard to resolve such a dilemma:
Whenever an employer applies a rule only to employees in a sexsegregated job classification, a prima facie case of discrimination
has been shown. To date, no court has adopted this standard.
Although the dissent pointed to Sprogis to illustrate a case using
this standard, the Sprogis court decided that dispute under the
disparate treatment theory. In Sprogis, similarly situated men
and women were treated differently because of their gender.
Furthermore, the Sprogis court dealt with an issue affecting a
fundamental right-the right of marriage.
In sum, the majority's decision agrees with the present state
of the law on flight attendant weight restriction and may even
be more liberal in terms of considering issues that other courts
have ignored. The dissent may point the way for a new standard
or theory under Title VII which would resolve the dilemma
where segregated classes exist and suffer discriminatory practices, but are unable to establish prima facie cases within the
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present theoretical framework of Title VII.
Jacqueline Martinez

V. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In other cases decided by the Ninth Circuit, the court refused to disturb a Naval regulation which provides for discharge
solely on a person's sexual preference, required that verdicts
from a bench trial be facially consistent, and allowed commercial
pilots with a prior history of alcholism to qualify to fly.

A.

HOMOSEXUAL DISCRIMINATION UPHELD

In Beller v. Middendorf,} the Ninth Circuit upheld Navy
regulations which discharge persons solely on the basis of homosexual activity.' When confronted with evidence gathered by the
military, plaintiffs' admitted their homosexuality.· Subsequently, the Navy convened administrative discharge boards
and discharged plaintiffs.' Plaintiffs received honorable military
discharges, although their military files state they are unfit for
military service and ineligible for reenlistment!' Plaintiffs challenged the discharge in the district court and, on appeal, asserted a fifth amendment denial of due process claim." The
Ninth Circuit upheld the challenged regulations based on the
special needs of the military.s
1. 632 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1980) (per Kennedy, J; the other panel members were
Browning, J. and Christensen, D.J., sitting by designation), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 3030,
rehearing, rehearing en bane denied, 647 F.2d 80 (1981).
2. The Naval Personnel Manual provides in relevant part: "Members may be recom·
mended for discharge by reason of unfitness for: ... (e) Homosexual acts. Processing for
discharge is mandatory...." 632 F.2d at 803 n.ll (citing BUPKRSMAN 3420220).
3. Beller is the consolidation of three cases: Beller v. Middendorf, Miller v. Rums·
field and Saal v. Middendorf. Saal was stationed at Alameda Naval Air Station, and was
discharged for having a homosexual affair with another enlisted penon stationed at Ala·
meda Naval Air Station. 632 F.2d at 792·93. Miller was stationed at Alameda Naval Air
Station aboard the USS Oriskany. He was discharged for engaging in homosexual acts
with two Taiwanese nationals while stationed in Taiwan. ld. at 793·94. Beller was dis·
charged after his homosexuality was discovered during an investigation conducted for
the purpose of raising Beller's security clearance. ld. at 794·95.
4. ld. at 793, 795.
5. ld. at 806.
6. ld. at 806·07. Two of the three plaintiffs have not tried to reenlist. The third,
however, applied for and was denied reenlistment. ld.
7. ld. at 807.
8. ld. at 812.
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The court first disposed of issues raised by the Navy concerning lack of subject matter jurisdiction,' mootness,t° and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.l1 Having determined
that plaintiffs claims were properly before the court, the Beller
panel applied the procedural and substantive due process analyses to determine whether the Navy regulation violated plaintiffs
fifth amendment rights.
Procedural due process requires the Navy not to deprive
plaintiffs of a property or liberty interest without proper proceedings. I1 The court dismissed the plaintiffs' property interest
claim13 which was based on the Naval policy that homosexual
activity is cause for discharge. Plaintiffs' admissions that they
engaged in homosexual acts extinguished any reasonable expectations of continued employment they may have had. 1• The
court fdund the question of plaintiffs' loss of a liberty interest
more difficult. 11 In resolving the issue, it was determinative that
the plaintiffs admitted their homosexual acts, and that plaintiffs
had the opportunity to introduce evidence to support their arguments that the Secretary should exercise his discretion to retain
9. The court found district court jurisdiction to hear the cases based on 28 U.S.C. §
1331 (1976). 632 F.2d at 795. The Ninth Circuit also decided that the amount in contro·
versy was not essential to the district court's jurisdiction since the suit was brought
against an officer of the United States acting within his official capacity. [d.
The Navy raised the issue of soveriegn immunity, but the court disposed of the issue
under 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976). Section 702 allows suits against the United States, provided
that any resulting injunctive decree or order specifies the federal officer or officers per·
sonally responsible for compliance. 632 F.2d at 796-97.
10. The court dismissed the Navy's contention that the appeals were moot and
pointed out that plaintiffs claims of stigmatization and potential employment difficulties
are continuing damages, hence valid to litigate, despite the expiration of plaintiffs' enlistment terms. 632 F.2d at SOO.
11. To support this contention, the Navy cited Champagne v. Schlesinger, 506 F.2d
979 (7th Cir. 1974), where the court required a person to appeal to the Board of Correction of Naval Records before contesting his denial of reenlistment in district court. [d. at
984. The Beller court avoided dealing with this squarely by reasoning that Champagne
dealt with reenlistment, while the instant case concerned discharges. 632 F.2d at 801.
The court stated that the Ninth Circuit has not required total exhaustion of administrative remedies before challenging regulations on constitutional grounds. [d. (citing Glines
v. Wade, 586 F.2d 675 (9th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brown v. Glines,
440 U.S. 957 (1980)i Downen v. Warner, 418 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1973)).
12. 632 F.2d at 805. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. The property interest in question was wages.
14. 632 F.2d at 805.
15. [d. at 805-06. Apparently, a deprivation of liberty could be presumed if the
Navy's charges were false, made public, and followed by discharge. [d. at 806.
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them. I6 The court concluded the plaintiffs' liberty interests were
protected by the hearings they received. 1'7
Addressing the substantive due process issue, the court declined to consider the plaintiffs' claim that homosexual conduct
is protected as an aspect of the fundamental right of privacy.I8
Since plaintiffs' claim was based on a deprivation of substantive
due process, not on denial of equal protection,!" the Ninth Circuit scrutinized the regulation by employing a balancing test.IO
The court relied on recent Supreme Court decisions involving
substantive due process to support this approach.1I
The Beller court's due process scrutiny of the regulation involved a "balancing of the nature of the individual interests allegedly infringed, the importance of the government interests
furthered, the degree of infringement, ,and the sensitivity of the
government entity responsibile for the regulation to more carefully tailored alternative means of achieving its goals.''I1 The
court compared the substantive due process analysis to the lowest tier of equal protection scrutiny in cases where conduct not
protected as a fundamental right is subject to government regulations.18 In such cases, the court explained, "[a] rational relation to a legitimate government interest will normally suffice to
uphold the regulation."lW However, where the government regu16. Jd. The court relied on the reasoning of Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977).

17. Plaintiffs argued that they received the stigma of "unfitness" for retention without a hearing on the issue. However, the court rejected this contention because
[tlhe mere fact of discharge from a government position does:
not deprive a person of a liberty interest. The real stigma imposed by the Navy's action, moreover, is the charge of homosexuality, not the fact of discharge or some implied statement
that the individual is not sufficiently needed to be retained.
632 F.2d at 806 (citations omitted).
18. The court conceded that if the right to engage in homosexual conduct is a fundamental right, such conduct would be "subjeCt to prohibition only to further compelling
state interests and ... the ... burden imposed by the regulation must be a necesaary,
or the least restrictive way to promote those interests." Jd. at 807.
19.1d.
20.1d.

21. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 396 (1978) (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment) (citing Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the
result)); Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977) (plurality opinion), cited
in Beller, 632 F.2d at 807.
22. 632 F.2d at 807.
23. Id. at 807-0B.
24. Jd. at B08.
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lation "seriously intrudes into matters which lie at the core of
interests which deserve due process protection, then the compelling state interest test employed in equal protection cases may
be used by the Court to describe the appropriate due process
analysis."11 The court concluded that this case lay somewhere
between the two standards. Ie
The panel acknowledged the substantial academic support
for the argument that the choice to engage in homosexual action
is a personal decision entitled to recognition as an aspect of an
individual's fundamental right of privacy," but cited substantial
authority to the contrary.lIB Although the court conceded that
some kinds of government regulation of private consensual homosexual behavior may face substantial constitutional challenge,I8 it distinguished Beller on the ground that it involved
military regulations prohibiting personnel from engaging in homosexual conduct while in the service."
An .assessment of the military regulations was required be-

cause the military is " 'by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.' "11 The court concluded that the importance of the government interests furthered by the
regulations outweigh "whatever heightened solicitude is appropriate for consensual private homosexual conduct."11 The nature
of the employer was "crucial" to its decision." The court explained that although one does not surrender constitutional
rights upon entering the military, such rights must be viewed in
light of the special circumstances and needs of the armed
25.ld.
26. Id. at 809.
27. Id. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15·13 (1978); Comment,
Out of the CICNIet, Out of a Job: Due Process in Teacher Disqualification, 6 HAsTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 663 (1979); Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homo·
sexual Conduct, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1613 (1974).
28. 632 F.2d at 809·10. See, e.g., Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901
(1976).
29. 632 F.2d at 810.
30. Id. The court contrasted cases involving military regulations with cases where
the state, through its criminal process, coerces persons to comply with moral precepts
even when they involve private acts of consenting adults. Id.
31. Id. (quoting Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974)).
32. 632 F.2d at 810.

33.ld.
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forces. a4 Therefore, regulations which might infringe upon constitutional rights in other contexts may survive scrutiny because
of military necessities.81
Among the grounds cited by the court as support for the
Navy regulation are: protecting the fabric of military life, preserving the integrity of the recruiting process, maintaining discipline of personnel in active service, and insuring the acceptance
of military personnel abroad. ae In addition, the Navy "could
conclude rationally that toleration of homosexual conduct . . .
might be understood as tacit approval."" Finally, the court concluded that although the rule might be broader than necessary
to accomplish some of its goals, in view of the importance of the
military's role, and the special need for discipline and order in
the service, the regulation represented a reasonable effort to accommodate the needs of the government as well as the interests
of the individual.
The opinion reflects unwarranted deference to the military.
The panel's acceptance of the Navy's alleged interests in preserving the integrity of the recruiting process, maintaining discipline among active duty personnel, and insuring the acceptance
of military personnel abroad, are particularly suspect. The business of the Navy is to fight or be prepared to fight wars. The
accomplishment of this mission does not entail the foisting of
the Navy's views of morality on its members or the protection of
the sensibilities of foreign nationals. Nor was the panel persuasive in arguing, not that public conduct might impinge on recruitment, discipline, and public image, but that private, consensual acts were so destructive as to warrant arbitrary and
automatic discharge.
The opinion is an inflexible acceptance of intolerance of the
sort that could not withstand judicial scrutiny were it based on
race or sex. Even if the Navy's interests were legitimate, it is
difficult to see how they can survive either the strict scrutiny
applicable to a fundamental right or the heightened scrutiny
34.
35.
36.
37.

rd.
rd. at 810-11.
rd. at 811.
rd.
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used by the Beller panel. 88
B.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT PROSCRIBES FACIALLY INCONSISTENT VERDICTS FROM A BENCH TRIAL

In United States v. Duz-Mor Diagnostic Laboratory, Inc.,8e

the Ninth Circuit held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment proscribes facially inconsistent verdicts from
a bench trial in a criminal prosecution unless the trial court
demonstrates by appropriate findings that the conviction validly
rests on a rational basis. The trial judge convicted the defendant
corporation of Medicare and Medi-Cal fraud. However, it dismissed the indictment of Irigene Morehead, president of the defendant corporation, who, with her husband, owned all the
shares of the corporation. On appeal, defendant challenged the
constitutionality of the inconsistent verdicts when the only evidence of culpability applied equally to both it and its
president.40
In resolving this issue, the Ninth Circuit first noted that the
Second Circuit, in Rivera v. Harris,41 confronted a similar question. In Rivera, three defendants faced criminal charges.4I At
trial, the prosecution presented evidence that all three defendants took part in the criminal acts. The defense called as its
38. See order denying rehearing, 647 F.2d 80 (1981) (Norris and Boochever, J.J.,
dissenting).
Judge Norris dissented from the court's rejection of the ~uggestion for rehearing en
banco He argued that (1) the Beller panel seriously misconstrued the proper methodology
of substantive due proce88 analysis; (2) the question of whether private consensual homosexual activity is protected as an aspect of the fundamental right of privacy, though
"avoided" by the Beller panel, is "crucial" to the proper due process analysis; and (3) the
Navy's justification for the regulation are so "wholly inadequate" that the regulation is
unconstitutional. Id. at 80-88.
Judge Boochever concurred in part with the Norris di88ent. He stated: "Assuming
that the Navy's profeBBed interests are legitimate they cannot survive either the strict
scrutiny test applicable to fundamental rights or the "heightened solicitude" test used by
the Beller panel. [d. at SO.
39. 650 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Goodwin, J.; the other panel members were
Schroeder, J. and East, D.J., sitting by designation).
40. Evidence implicating defendant and Morehead included a tape· recorded conversation between an undercover agent and Morehead concerning an allegedly illegal kickback agreement. The trial judge heard the tapes before granting Morehead's motion to
dismiss and denying an identical motion by defendant corporation. [d. at 225.
41. 643 F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1981).
42. The three defendants faced five charges each. The trial judge acquitted all three
defendants on two of those charges. Id. at 89. The remaining three led to the constitutional challenge.
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only witness one defendant who testified that all three defendants were innocent. 48 The trial judge, hearing the case without
a jury, convicted two of the three defendants and acquitted the
third. The Second Circuit reversed and remanded the decision
based on the fact that the facially inconsistent verdicts constituted a prima facie case of denial of due process. 44
The Ninth Circuit noted that other circuits are split over
the issue of inconsistent verdicts from bench trials.40 The court,
however, found the question open within this circuit and
adopted the Rivera approach. 4 '
C. PRIOR ALCOHOLISM: No AUTOMATIC BAR TO FAA FLIGHT
QUALIFICATION
In Jensen v. Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration,47 the Ninth Circuit invalidated Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations48 which disqualified all persons with
a history of alcoholism from obtaining medical certificates required for a commercial pilot's license.41
Jensen, who holds a lifetime commercial pilot certificate,
43. [d. at 88-89.

44. Id. at 98.
45. 650 F.2d at 225-26. The court distinguished Duz-Mor from two earlier Ninth
Circuit cases which affirmed inconsistent verdicts. McElheny v. United States, 146 F.2d
932 (9th Cir. 1944), involved inconsistencies between multiple counts of an indictment as
opposed to that between verdicts of multiple defendants. In United States v. ZamoraCorona, 465 F.2d 427 (9th Cir. 1972), the court never reached the iaeue of inconsistent
verdicts because it concluded that the verdicts were not neceaearily inconsistent.
The Duz-Mor court also noted that in United States v. West, 549 F.2d 545, 553 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977), the Eighth Circuit sustained inconsistent verdicts
on multiple counts of an indictment.
46. 650 F.2d at 226-27. The court permits inconsistent verdicts in jury trials because
individual jurors may disagree in aesessing evidence and courts dislike invading the jurors decision-making province. [d. at 226. In bench trials, however, neither factor comes
into play and the judge must rule consistently. [d.
The Duz-Mor court also noted that this case involved a dismil88l whereas in Rivera
there was an acquittal. However, to distinguish the two cases on that basis would "make
this case turn upon the formal point that inconsistent substance can be overlooked when
erroneous form was employed." [d. at 227 n.4. Consequently, the court extended the
Rivera approach to dismissals.
47. 641 F.2d 797 (9th Cir. 1981) (per Solomon, D.J., sitting by designation; the other
panel members were Fletcher, J. and Trask, J., dissenting).
48. 14 C.F.R. §§ 67.15, 67.17 (1980).
49. FAA regulations require commercial pilots to have both an FAA commercial pilot certificate and a second-class medical certificate. 641 F.2d at 798.
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applied to the FAA for recertification of his second-class medical
certificate. He disclosed his history of alcoholism, but asserted
he was fully cured. The FAA denied his application without a
hearing under FAA regulations which automatically disqualify
all prior alcoholics from obtaining medical certificates. The denial was affirmed by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB).IIO
The majority applied provisions of the Comprehensive Alcohol Abuse and Alcohol Prevention, Treatment, and Rehabilitation Act of 1970 (the Alcoholism Act),lIl which prohibits the denial of jobs and privileges to reformed alcoholics solely because
of their history of alcoholism. III The FAA argued that certificates
were not denied solely on the grounds of prior alcoholism since
the FAA administration had discretion to grant an exemption
from the rule if it would be "in the public interest" and "would
not adversely affect safety."IIS The majority rejected this contention, finding that exemption from the rule, at the Administrator's discretion, could not cure the direct conflict between the
disqualifying regulations and the Alcoholism Act.a. In addition,
the exemption procedures did not comport with due process.1III
The Jensen court concluded that, although the challenged disqualifying regulations were held valid, the FAA may still consider alcoholism a problem in its certification process, albeit on a
case-by-case basis."
50.ld.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4561(c)(1) (1976). This section provides in part: "No person may be
denied or deprived of Federal civilian or other employment or a Federal professional or
other license or right solely on the grounds of prior alcohol abuse or prior alcoholism."
52. 641 F.2d at 798.
53. Id. at 799. The FAA based its argument on 14 C.F.R. § 1l.27(e) (1980) which
provides that "[i]f the Administrator determines, after consideration of any comments
received in response to a summary of a petition for exemption, that the petition is in the
public interest, the Administrator [may grant] the exemption."
54. 641 F.2d at 799.
55. In reaching this conclusion, the majority found it determinative that the FAA
need not grant an applicant a hearing before passing on the application, and that the
decisions were reviewable under the "arbitrary and capricious standard." Id. See Keating
v. FAA, 610 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1979). In addition, the court explained that due process
requires, for a meaningful review of an agency decision, that the agency must have articulated standards governing its determinations. In the instant case, the FAA standard
did not give the court sufficient basis for review. 641 F.2d at 799.
56. 641 F.2d at 799. Inquiries into the effect of prior alcoholism under 14 C.F.R. §
67.15(d)(ii) (1980) would comply with the Alcoholism Act, according to the court, because jobs and privileges will not be denied to reformed alcoholics solely because of their
history of Alcoholism. 14 C.F.R. § 67.15(d)(ii) (1980) provides that an applicant must

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1982

83

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [1982], Art. 5

108

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:100

establish that he has:
[nJo other personality disorder. neurosis. or mental condition
that the Federal Air Surgeon finds(a) Makes the applicant unable to safely perform the
duties or exercise the privileges of the airman certificate
that he holds or for which he is applying ... and the
findings are based on the case history and appropriate.
qualified. medical judgment relating to the condition
involved.
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